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SOME SUGGESTIONS FROM A COMPARISON
OF BRITISH AND AMERICAN TENDER
OFFER REGULATION*
Douglas M. Bransont
With the economic slowdown and the bear market of 1969-70, the
time is right to reflect anew on the regulation of a recent phenomenon
of the corporate acquisition field-the tender offer.' As the stock
market recovers, acquisition-minded firms will covetously inspect the
underpriced issues that the bear market has left in its wake. Many of
the acquisitions that will occur will utilize the tender offer as a means
of taking advantage of low share prices. Of course, the regulation of
tender offers has been discussed in the periodicals at length.2 And
* The author wishes to thank Professor David S. Ruder of the Northwestern Univer-
sity School of Law for his counsel and assistance in the preparation of this article.
j Member of the Ohio and Illinois Bars. BA. 1965, University of Notre Dame; J.D.
1970, Northwestern University.
I Tender offer includes both cash and exchange offers. In the cash offer the aggressor
corporation offers cash to the target company's shareholders, generally for voting shares
of the target. In the exchange offer the aggressor offers its common stock, debt, convertible
debt, warrants, or some combination thereof for shares in the target. There may also be
a hybrid--cash and securities for target shares. Whatever the offering, the common de-
nominator of all tender offers is that the aggressor seeks to acquire an interest in the target
corporation by dealing directly with target company shareholders rather than by dealing
solely with target company management.
From July 1968 to February 1969, the Securities and Exchange Commission received
registration statements covering 104 exchange offers. During the same period, only 54
cash offers were filed at the Commission. The Chairman of the SEC attributed the shift
to exchange offers to tight money. Hearings on Problems in the Securities Industry Before
the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 13-14 (1969). Further reduction in the total number of tender offers, stock or cash,
is taking place: "It is harder to obtain cash in the tight money market. Common-stock
offers become less attractive as price-earnings ratios go down." Cohen, Takeover Bids, 26
FsNcx CLs ANALYrsTS J. 26, 27 (1970).
2 E.g., Bromberg, The Securities Law of Tender Offers, 15 N.Y.L.F. 459 (1969); Cohen,
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scholars who deny the necessity of any securities regulation based on
disclosure aside,3 there remain critics of the regulatory system.4 These
critics have pondered shortcomings in present tender offer regulation,
in Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) practices in the tender
offer area, and in the principles of legislative and administrative regula-
tion underlying the entire securities field.5 One approach, however, has
not been thoroughly explored-the comparative view.6 For purposes of
comparison, the British regulatory system is the most interesting and
the most helpful.
In the English-speaking world, many systems of securities regula-
tion follow the American approach to tender offers. The Canadian
provinces, for example, have systems based on a statutory framework
and administered by a governmental agency. Disclosure and filing, as
in our system, are keynotes of Canadian schemes. 7 Because these other
systems greatly resemble the American system, not much is to be gained
by comparison. The British system offers similarities for use as a
starting point, but in the tender offer area there is much divergence
between the British and American systems. American authorities have
cited the British experience in the tender offer area as a model of a
well-established regulatory scheme.8 Nothing could be further from the
Tender Offers and Takeover Bids, 23 Bus. LAw. 611 (1968); Schmults & Kelly, Disclosure
in Connection with Cash Takeover Bids: The New Regulations, 24 Bus. LAw. 19 (1968);
Comment, Regulation of Contested Cash Tender Offers, 46 TExAs L. REv. 915 (1968);
Comment, Senate Bill 510 and the Cash Tender Offer, 14 WAYNE L. R, v. 568 (1968).
3 Manne, Cash Tender Offers for Shares: A Reply to Chairman Cohen, 1967 Du
L.J. 231; Swanson, S. 510 and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers: Distinguishing St.
George from the Dragon, 5 HAsv. J. LEGIs. 431 (1968).
4 Some criticism centers around technical faults in the present legislation. See 6
L. Loss, SEcuRtrrEs REouLAirO 3665-69 (2d ed. Supp. 1969). Other articles probe the entire
implementation of the disclosure philosophy in present tender offer regulation. See, e.g.,
Hamilton, Some Reflections on Cash Tender Offer Legislation, 15 N.Y.L.F. 269 (1969);
Krasik, Tender Offers: The Target Company's Duty of Disclosure, 25 Bus. LAw. 455 (1969).
And one ably argues against the tender offer's social and economic utility. Kelly, Some
Observations on Contested Take-Over Bids, 15 N.Y.L.F. 618 (1969).
5 SEC, REPORT ON DiscLosuRE TO INVESrORS: REAPPRAISAL OF ADMINISTRATIVE PoLIcIES
UNDER THE '33 AND '34 Acts (1969) [hereinafter cited as WHEAT REPORT]. The Wheat Report
is a response to and one of the best summaries of that criticism. See also Manne, Insider
Trading and the Administrative Process, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 473 (1967); Schneider,
Acquisition Under the Federal Securities Acts-A Program for Reform, 116 U. PA. L.
REV. 1323 (1968).
8 Some tangential comparative observations are found in Fleischer & Mundheim,
Corporate Acquisition by Tender Offer, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 317, 323-28 (1967). See also 6
L. Loss, supra note 4, at 3649-54.
7 See Falby, Takeover Bids and the Securities Act of 1966, 5 OSGOODE HA L L.J. 227
(1967).
8 Professor Loss has commented that the takeover area "is one important area of
securities regulation where the British until recently were in advance of the Americans."
6 L. Loss, supra note 4, at 3649. See also Fleischer & Mundheim, supra note 6.
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truth. The British have no direct regulation of tender offers-they
have self-regulation-and British self-regulation, which has undergone
extensive change since its institution in 1959, functioned ineffectively
until 1969. 9
British experience with the tender offer is extensive, 10 covering
the last twenty years,1 with regulatory efforts spanning a twelve-year
period. During those years the British financial community, as
opposed to Parliament or a governmental agency, has experimented
with and developed a pervasive body of rules and principles. Those
principles suggest a new structure for tender offer regulation which
could greatly improve the American regulatory system. 12
The following comparative examination will survey American and
British tender offer regulation and will illustrate British regulation by
discussion of one takeover bid, the Leasco Data Processing-Pergamon
Press affair, the first instance in which the British regulatory system
operated at full capacity in an efficient manner and in its present form.
I
TERMINOLOGY AND JURIsDICTION
At the outset, the terms tender offer and takeover bid should be
defined. Although the former is of American and the latter of British
vernacular, the two terms are normally used interchangeably. The
tender offer or takeover bid must be viewed in contradistinction to
other forms of corporate combination. In consolidation or merger, the
negotiations normally take place between managements. Following
9 See text accompanying notes 145-77 infra.
10 Great Britain does not have, however, a system of statutory merger:
We have no exact counterpart of the method of merging of corporations
which I believe is common in the United States. I understand that it is possible,
for example, for Corporation A to be quite simply merged with Corporation B,
all the assets and liabilities of both parties to the merger becoming vested in
Corporation B as the Surviving Corporation on the effective date of the merger.
There is no similar statutory machinery in England. To achieve a similar result
Company B (the surviving company) would acquire all the assets and liabilities
of Company A in return for cash or an allotment of shares in Company B. When
the acquisition is completed Company A is left with either a sum in cash or a
number of shares in Company B: Company A is then liquidated and the cash or
shares are distributed in the liquidation.
Peppiatt, British and American Business Law: A Brief Comparison, 16 Bus. LAw. 54, 59(1960).
11 See Penrose, Some Aspects of the Development, Criticism and Control of the Take-
Over Bid, Since 1945, 9 Juam. R.Ev. (n.s.) 128 (1964).
12 Exposition of the British system may also aid practitioners faced with a client de-
sirous of acquiring a British concern. On roughly 10 occasions in one sample year, Amer-
ican concerns moved to acquire British firms by means of tender offers. Csrv PANr. oN
TA -OvERs AND MERcES, REPORT ON THE YEAR ENDED 31sT MARCH 1969, at 9 (1969).
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management agreement, the shareholders vot6 on the combination and
stock is issued either from the newly-formed corporation to the old
corporate shells (in consolidation), or from the surviving corporation to
the shareholders of the disappearing corporation (in merger).13 Pur-
chase of assets involves a transfer of stock or cash by the acquiring corpo-
ration to the acquired corporation in exchange for the assets and liabili-
ties of that corporation. The acquired corporation normally liquidates,
distributing the cash or stock that it has received to its shareholders.14
There again, as in merger, negotiations are between managements, and
shareholders will vote on the transaction. The feature distinguishing
tender offer from these other forms of reorganization is that the
management of the acquiring corporation deals directly with share-
holders of the company in which the acquirer seeks an interest.15
A further distinction can be made between the cash tender offer
and the stock tender offer. In the stock offer, also called exchange offer,
the acquirer transfers stock directly to target company shareholders in
exchange for shares of the target.16 In a cash offer, the acquirer also
deals directly with target company shareholders, but the medium is
cash. In both types of tender offer, the acquirer may seek only invest-
ment in a small number of target shares, working control through a
larger portion but less than half the target's outstanding shares, numeri-
cal control, more than eighty percent of the voting shares, or complete
ownership.17
While these general notions of what a tender offer is or is not
are the same in both the United States and Great Britain, the jurisdic-
tional elements of the two regulatory systems vary slightly. Both
the British City Code on Take-Overs and Mergers and the
British Licensed Dealers (Conduct of Business) Rules 8 define takeover
18 This is the "A" reorganization under American tax law. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 368(a)(I)(A).
14 If the acquisition is solely for voting stock, there may be a "C" reorganization. Id.
§ 368(a)(I)(C).
15 The tender offer involves a vital regulatory difference since the target company
management does not necessarily deal with the acquirer nor do shareholders vote on the
matter. In tender offers, shareholders may not receive the benefit of management's advice
and bargaining power or the benefit of proxy regulations designed to aid shareholders in
voting on merger or purchase of assets.
16 If the 80% control requirement is met, there may be a "B" reorganization. INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954, § 368(a)(I)(B). The shares offered in exchange must be registered
under the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1964).
17 The American aggressor will often seek 80% of the offeree's shares so as to permit
filing of consolidated income tax returns, the elimination of the intercorporate tax on
dividends, and to accomplish a tax-free exchange. nrr. Rv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 243(b), 854.
18 The two documents form the heart of British tender offer regulation.
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bid. According to the Licensed Dealers Rules, a takeover bid is "an
offer to acquire securities of a corporation made to more than one
holder of those securities calculated to result in any person acquiring,
or becoming entitled to acquire, control of that corporation ....- 19
The City Code defines "offer" as "take-over and merger transactions
howsoever effected," 20 and by describing its jurisdiction over offers in
terms of takeovers, the City Code, where appropriate, incorporates the
standard definition of that term as found in the Licensed Dealers Rules.
The British, though, use the term merger in a sense different from the
American usage, for there is no British equivalent to our statutory mer-
ger;21 rather, British merger is the equivalent of the American purchase
of assets.
The British regulatory system applies with few differences to ex-
change offers and cash offers alike. The principal difference is that, over
and above complying with the takeover regulations, a company making
an exchange offer may have to include a few more disclosures in the
takeover circular or may have to publish a prospectus for the securities
offered target shareholders. 22 Thus, British takeover regulation covers
exchange offers, cash tender offers, and purchase of assets-all forms of
reorganization under British law-and in both the cash and stock offer
categories, the British system primarily regulates offers seeking control. 23
In light of recent amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, the American securities system no longer treats exchange offers
and cash offers as dissimilar forms of reorganization.24 Both exchange
and cash offerors must comply with sections 13(d) and 14(d) of the 1934
Act;25 in addition, an exchange offeror ordinarily must meet the
registration and prospectus requirements of the Securities Act of
1933.26
As a result of this basic similarity, control becomes a basic element
19 Licensed Dealers (Conduct of Business) Rules, rule 18(1), [1960] 1 STAT. INsrR. 391
(No. 1216).
20 IssuiNG HousEs Ass'N, CrrY CODE oN TAxE-OvxaS AND MERGEmS 5 (rev. ed. 1969)
(Definitions).
21 Note 10 supra.
22 See text accompanying notes 204-07 infra.
23 British self-regulation affects purchase of assets. Regulation is principally by the
stock exchanges and not by the Panel on Take-Overs and Mergers.
24 Pub. L. No. 91-567, § 4 (Dec. 22, 1970), amending Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
§ 14(d)(8), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(8) (Supp. V, 1970). This new provision deletes the former
§ 14(d)(8)(A), thus making the American cash tender offer or Williams Bill rules applicable
to stock offers, and extending the protection afforded by these rules to such offers. S. REP.
No. 1125, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1970).
25 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), 78n(d) (Supp. V, 1970).
26 Id. §§ 77a-77aa (1964).
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of regulatory jurisdiction over both forms of tender offer. Although
legislation relating to tender offers fails to define that term,27 its
primary purpose is to regulate offers involving control. American
offerors must file certain disclosures with the SEC before implementing
any bid to another issuer's shareholders which has the purpose of
acquiring five percent or more of a class of that issuer's equity securi-
ties; 28 the Commission has the power to exempt from the filing regula-
tions tender offers "not having the effect of... changing or influencing
the control of the issuer .... ",29
When the intention is to pay for shares tendered with securities,
considerations other than control are also involved. If the payment of
shares for shares will constitute a public offering of securities, the offeror
must comply with the registration and prospectus requirements of
the 1933 Act as to the shares offered. The most important exemption from
this requirement is the so-called private placement. Under section
4(2), the offeror may avoid registration and prospectus rules by offering
securities to a few sophisticated investors who together have a con-
trolling block of target company shares.30
American tender offer regulation has a jurisdictional element
based on the acquisition target's size or status. In order for the federal
tender offer regulations to apply, the securities for which an offer is
made must be equity securities of a registered company. Under the
Securities Exchange Act, section 12(b) companies are those having
securities registered on a national exchange; section 12(g) companies
are those having assets exceeding one million dollars in value and a
2T Curiously, however, Congress made no attempt to define the critical phrase
"tender offer for, or a request or invitation for tenders," as used in section
14(d). While this language clearly covers the straightforward offer to purchase,
it is unclear, for example, whether section 14(d) covers unpublicized offers to
large holders through the use of the mails, or private orders to brokers to assemble a
block of the stock through the exchange. Presumptively, at least, such offers or
orders are covered, and the SEC has so stated.
Hamilton, supra note 4, at 278 (footnote omitted). The author notes that SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 8392 (Aug. 30, 1968) "states that a special bid to purchase equity
securities through the facilities of a national securities exchange ordinarily constitutes a
tender offer under section 14(d)." Hamilton, supra note 4, at 278 n.42.
28 Notes 44-46 and accompanying text infra.
29 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)(5)(D), 78m(d)(8)(D) (Supp. V, 1970), as amended, Pub. L. No.
91-567, §§ l(b), 4 (Dec. 22, 1970). As a result of the recent amendments, these provisions
have been redesignated §§ 13(d)(4)(D) and 14(d)(8)(C) of the Act.
30 Id. § 77d(2) (1964).
The British regulatory system does not concern itself with any public-private dis-
tinction. Control is the key element in both cash and stock bids. British regulation
specifically refers to what would be a private offering in the United States, making the
regulatory scheme a priori applicable to bids to a few stockholders. See text accompanying
note 247 infra.
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class of equity security held by five hundred or more persons.3 ' British
company law also has classifications of companies according to size
which figure in determining the applicability of takeover regulation.
A British company is a private one if the articles of association restrict
the rights to transfer shares, limit the number of members to fifty, and
prohibit public offerings of the company's shares or debentures; if the
articles of association do not so provide, the company is a public one.82
The British takeover regulations apply to all takeovers involving a
public company either as offeror or offeree, whether or not the company
has its shares quoted; the system excepts only an offer in which a public
company takes over a private company, likely in most cases to be an
insignificant acquisition. 3
II
AMERICAN REGULATION
A. Tender Offers and the 1934 Act
Although recent legislation has made the tender offer provisions
of the Securities Exchange Act applicable to both cash and exchange
offers, 34 these provisions were developed as a reaction to the increased
use of cash tender offers in making corporate acquisitions.
The cash tender offer was virtually unknown in the United States
until the 1960's. Once discovered, it was found to have numerous
advantages over the proxy fight or stock tender offer.35 Soon, instead of
31 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(b), (g) (1964).
32 Companies Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 28(1). The consequences that flow
from the British private-public distinction are akin to those flowing from the American
states' classification of companies as close corporations. See R. PENNINGTON, COMPANY LAW
613-15 (2d ed. 1967); cf. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 341-56 (Supp. 1968).
33 City Panel on Take-Overs and Mergers, Practice Note No. 1: Private Companies
and Unquoted Public Companies (Aug. 1, 1969). The note sets out the wide coverage of
the City Code. Even takeovers by a public company of a private company are governed
by the Code if the acquisition is not insignificant:
[Ain exception [to the disclaimer of jurisdiction over public companies' acquisi-
tions of private firms] would be where, for instance, the relative sizes of the two
companies [i.e., target which although private is larger than the offeror] and
other circumstances are such that the transaction effectively constitutes a reverse
take-over and where a change in effective control of the offeror would result.
Id. at 2.
34 Note 24 supra.
35 These advantages were "secrecy, speed, simplicity and savings." Sowards & Mofsky,
Corporate Take-Over Bids: Gap in Federal Securities Regulation, 41 ST. JOHN'S L. Rv.
499, 501 (1967). The authors intimate that many of the cash tender offer's advantages
arose from absence of legislation. For a listing of the advantages a cash tender offer has
over a proxy fight, see 6 L. Loss, supra note 4, at 3655-57.
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using the cash tender offer only after failure in direct negotiations with
management, acquirers went directly to shareholders with a cash offer
because they desired the simplicity of the cash route or had opted for a
regulation-free, speedy acquisition. At times, perhaps merely because
of an offeror corporation's superior bargaining power, direct dealing
with shareholders led to oppressive incidents.
Movement for cash tender offer regulation began in 1966, when
Senator Harrison Williams, Chairman of the Securities Subcommittee
of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, introduced a bill
designed to discipline corporations making tender offers.3Y In January
1967, Senator Williams introduced a second bill, one substantially the
same as the present legislation.37 In contrast to earlier statements
condemning corporate raiders, Senator Williams's remarks accompany-
ing his second bill indicated a supposedly new-found concern for
balancing the scales between offeror and target company, noted the
regulatory disparity between cash tenders on the one hand, and stock
offers and proxy fights on the other, and mentioned professional
opinion, including that of representatives of the SEC and the New
York Stock Exchange, supporting cash tender offer legislation.8 8 The
Senate Committee unanimously reported the Williams Bill, interject-
ing only one change. The New York Stock Exchange had persuaded the
Committee to delete a provision for a five-day waiting period after the
offeror had filed with the SEC, arguing that such a period would give
unfair advantage to target management in resisting offers.8 9 With
assurance that the securities industry had voiced approval, the Senate
passed the Williams Bill.40 A year later, after blind acceptance based
upon the financial community's concurrence, the House passed the
measure.41
386 S. 2731, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). One comment on that bill asserted:
Federal legislation was originally proposed with a view toward protecting
incumbent management from what were deemed to be reckless corporate raids....
The purpose of this bill is illustrated by the caption in the Congressional Record:
"Fuller Disclosure by and Protection Against so-called Corporate Raiders."
Hamilton, supra note 4, at 275 (footnotes omitted).
37 S. 510, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); 113 CONG. REc. 841 (1967).
38 113 CoNr,. REc. 854-55 (1967); see Sowards & Mofsky, supra note 35, at 500, 523.
89 S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1967); Hearings on S. 510 Before the
Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 71-76 (1967); 113 CONG. Rrc. 24662-64 (1967).
40 Senator Williams said at the time: "Representatives of the New York Stock
Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, the National Association of Securities Dealers,
the Investment Bankers Association, and Chairman Cohen of the Securities and Exchange
Commission ... have endorsed the legislation." 113 CONG. REc. 24664 (1967).
41 H.R. REiz. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); Hearings on S. 510 Before the
Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
[Vol. 56:685
TENDER OFFER REGULATION
The legislative history reveals little about the background of the
Williams Bill, except that the proposal was prompted by the sudden
rise in tender offers in the mid-1960's.42 The final product reflects the
basic infirmity that accompanied its birth-it was a stopgap measure
calculated to foil aggressive, acquisition-minded firms. The increased
prevalence of stock-for-stock exchange offers prompted Congress, in
1970, to make the cash tender offer regulations applicable to exchange
offers as well,43 but the essential weakness of the regulatory approach
has yet to be remedied.
1. The Five Percent Rule
American legislators and the SEC have created a comprehensive
system of tender offer regulation which separates prospective offerors
into two groups. One group must fie a certain information package
upon acquiring five percent of any class of a section 12 corporation's
equity securities, whether by means of a tender offer or not.45 The
other group files a similar package when making a tender offer, if by
that offer the offeror intends to obtain more than five percent of a class
of a section 12 company's equity securities. 46 Filing is made with the
SEC, the principal executive offices of the issuer of the shares sought,
and with each exchange on which such shares are traded. The first
category, five percent holders, must file within ten days after passing
the five percent mark. The other group must file at or before the time
their offer is communicated to target company shareholders.
Even these preliminary matters have given rise to litigation in the
short time the Williams Bill has been law; this litigation relates to an
Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). Representative Moss alluded again to the virtually
unanimous support for the bill:
I think the appearance before the committee of the Securities Exchange Com-
mission [sic], the Federal Reserve Board, the New York Stock Exchange, the
American Bankers' Association, the American Life Convention, and the Life
Insurance Association of America, and numerous other leading financial groups
would indicate a strong backing for this type of legislation.
114 CONG. REC. 21483 (1968). The bill swept through without significant opposition and
became law on July 29, 1968. Id. at 25005.
42 See text accompanying notes 35-36 supra.
43 H.R. REP. No. 1655, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 4, 6 (1970).
44 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 13(d)-(e), 14(d)-(f), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e),
78n(d)-(t) (Supp. V, 1970), as amended, Pub. L. No. 91-567, §§ 1-5 (Dec. 22, 1970); SEC
Regulation 131), 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-1 to d-101 (1970); SEC Regulation 141), id.
§§ 240.14d-I to d-101.
For a detailed description of the American regulation, see Bromberg, supra note 2.
45 Pub. L. No. 91-567, § l(a)(2) (Dec. 22, 1970), amending Securities Exchange Act of
1934, § 13(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (Supp. V, 1970).
46 Pub. L. No. 91-567, § 3(1) (Dec. 22, 1970), amending Securities Exchange Act of
1934, § 14(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (Supp. V, 1970).
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earlier ten percent ownership figure, recently reduced to five percent.
In Bath Industries, Inc. v. Blot,4 7 a group of Bath shareholders, includ-
ing a mutual fund, who in the aggregate held more than ten percent
of Bath's common stock, decided to oust management through a proxy
fight. A temporary restraining order against further pursuit of the plan
was upheld in a hearing on a preliminary injunction, the court stating
that section 13(d) of the 1934 Act required filing within ten days after
a ten percent group decided to act in concert for any purpose. s The
Seventh Circuit for the most part approved the trial court's view:
[I]t is our conclusion that the Act should be interpreted to require
compliance with its disclosure provisions when, but only when, any
group of stockholders owning more than 10%, of the outstanding
shares of the corporation agree to act in concert to acquire addi-
tional shares.
This construction focuses on the decision on the part of a
group owning more than 10% of a corporation to acquire more
shares. Thus it honors the repeated expressions of legislative intent
to draft a statute to protect investors rather than to protect current
management. It does not proscribe informal discussion among exist-
ing shareholders concerning the performance of current manage-
ment. Nor does it proscribe legitimate cooperation among existing
shareholders . . . to take over control of management, absent an
intention to acquire additional shares for the furtherance of such
purpose.49
Thus, even when American shareholders combine for purposes other
than making a tender offer, if their collective holding exceeds the new
five percent rule and further share acquistions are contemplated, they
are required to file under section 13.
The practice of warehousing involves an offeror who acquires
target company stock in the market before making the offer. Such
purchases will be at the lower, pre-bid price. The securities are held
in nominee or street names to avoid tipping off the unsuspecting
target. Manifestly, however, the offeror will not want to exceed the
now applicable five percent mark,50 for then section 13(d) would re-
47 805 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Wis. 1969), aft'd, 427 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1970).
48 Id. at 538.
49 Bath Indus., Inc. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97, 109-10 (7th Cir. 1970) (emphasis in original).
The court also concluded that Williams Bill filing did not pose an undue burden for a
group also complying with federal proxy regulations. Id. at 110.
50 Senator Williams and the SEC advocated the change to a five percent ownership
requirement primarily because of warehousing; they sensed something sinister in the
pre-offer practice of purchasing target company shares just short of the 10% level. H.R.
REP. No. 1655, supra note 43, at 3-5. The new requirement seems but an extension of the
original infirmity of the Williams Bill-the legislation was designed as a measure to place
strictures on aggressor corporations, rather than as a measure to aid investors or create
procedural devices making tender offers fairer to all parties involved.
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quire filing, and filing would foreclose a surprise bid. In Penn Mart
Realty Co. v. Becker,5' Glen Alden Corporation had warehoused target
company stock in contemplation of a future tender offer. Glen Alden
scrupulously avoided the then applicable ten percent rule52 by acquir-
ing the shares in the market and then secretly selling those shares to
mutual funds sympathetic to Glen Alden. In a rule lOb-55a derivative
action against Glen Alden directors for nondisclosure, the court dis-
missed the case:
In other words, plaintiff claims that the Glen Alden board bar-
gained with IDS [one of the mutual funds] and obtained not only
the $63 per share price for the stock, but also a promise to aid in
the tender offer, a service to Glen Alden the value of which is
presently unknown. Whatever the value of the package deal alleged
by plaintiff, it cannot allege that the board did not at all times act
in the interests of the corporation (and hence in the interests of
all shareholders) in this transaction. The directors may have bar-
gained poorly; they may even have wasted Glen Alden's assets. But
these allegations do not disclose deception of the type prohibited
by Rule l0b-5. 54
The Bath holding, however, had it been law at the time, would have
foiled Glen Alden's warehousing in preparation for a surprise bid.
Since Glen Alden and the mutual funds were not dealing at arm's
length, once their combined holding exceeded ten percent, they would
have been required to file, under section 13(d) and the Bath case,
thereby disclosing their holding in the target company. The Seventh
Circuit in Bath specifically rejected any contention that a warehousing
mutual fund that held shares in nominee names would not be counted
for Williams Bill purposes:
51 300 F. Supp. 731 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
52 At that time, before the Williams Bill's passage, this limit was imposed only by the
filing requirements of § 16(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1964).
53 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1970).
54 300 F. Supp. at 736. A practice similar to that in Penn Mart Realty, but by a third
party sympathetic to the target, has been held to violate lOb-5. In Crane Co. v. Westing-
house Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970), Crane
made an exchange offer to Air Brake shareholders. American Standard Corporation, which
planned to merge with Air Brake should Crane be warded off and was Air Brake's pre-
ferred suitor, began purchasing Air Brake stock in the market; this drove Air Brake share
prices towards the Crane offer price. To avoid filing and disclosure under § 16(a) of the
1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1964), American Standard secretly warehoused the Air Brake
shares with a friendly mutual fund. American Standard's and Air Brake's failure to dis-
close was held violative of lOb-5. Crane had standing to sue even though deception did not
involve a purchase or sale by Crane, as required by orthodox lOb-5 law. See note 87 infra.
Since Crane holds that defensive purchases and secret sales to avoid disclosure
made by a friend of the target violate lOb-5, a fortiori such a defensive warehousing
arrangement must be disclosed under the tender offer regulations.
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[Defendants] contend that the district court erred in construing the
term "beneficial owner" in the Act to include any person who has
the right to determine how shares are to be voted, whether or not
such person has any other incidents of ownership.
In the context of a contest for control, both the insurgents and
management are interested in the control of votes. If a mutual
fund, bank, trustee, broker or anyone else can guarantee a block
of votes, the legal title to such shares would appear irrelevant.55
The result is that the basic test for Williams Bill percentages is a
pragmatic one: if the group under consideration can corral five percent
voting power, the group must file.
2. Affirmative Disclosures
The information package to be filed under sections 13(d)(1) and
14(d)(1) upon reaching the five percent level or upon making a tender
offer includes background and identity of the prospective purchaser,
source and amount of funds with details of any borrowing transactions,
any plans for major changes in the offeree company's business or
structure should control be achieved, present holdings of offeree shares
and information as to arrangements or rights for further share acquisi-
tions, and other information that the Commission may by regulation
prescribe as "necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors."5 6 Amendments, if needed, are filed,57 and
subsequent requests or advertisements are also filed before release.58
55 427 F.2d at 112 (emphasis in original).
Another effect of warehousing, possibly leading to violation of the securities law, is
that
[i]n preparing for tan offer] . . . the aggressor ordinarily makes substantial
purchases of the target corporation's stock. The subsequent tender offer will
cause an increase in the market price of the tarket stock . . . Should the cash
tender offer fail to bring forth the required number of shares, the target shares
previously purchased by the aggressor are often disposed of at a tidy profit.
Hamilton, supra note 4, at 300-01. A court has recently held that such a practice can
result in offeror short-swing profit liability to the target. Emerson Elec. Co. v. Reliance
Elec. Co., 206 F. Supp. 588 (E.D. Mo. 1969). Section 16(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 US.C.
§ 78p(b) (1964), provides that if sales of securities held for less than six months are made
by persons required to file under § 16(a), the profits from such sales inure to the issuer of
such securities. Such profits are colloquially called short-swing profits.
56 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)(1), 78n(d)(1) (Supp. V, 1970). The Commission has not yet
imposed any important additional disclosure requirements. Schedules 13D and 14D, 17
C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-101, 240.14d-101 (1970), set forth only a format. The power to require
target company disclosure is found in § 14(d)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(4) (Supp. V, 1970):
"Any solicitation or recommendation to the holders of such a security to accept or reject
a tender offer . .. shall be made in accordance with such rules .. . as the Commission
may prescribe ... "
57 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(2) (Supp. V, 1970).
58 Id. § 78n(d)(1).
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The intended benefit of each disclosure item, to both target
shareholders and the offeree company, is readily apparent. Absence of
information about the identity and plans of offerors has long plagued
American stockholders asked to tender shares. 59 With such information
available, a shareholder may decide to retain shares, hoping that what
he evaluates as better management, the offeror, will win control of the
target company. He may also decide to sell in order to avoid bad
management by either the incumbent or prospective board, or he may
decide to retain his shares in order to support present management.
Without even the identity of the offeror at hand, a shareholder cannot
gather information on the competence of the offeror in order to
evaluate these alternatives. Statements as to present holdings of offeree
shares and arrangements for other share acquisitions aid the target
shareholder in evaluating the alternatives: he can see whether the
offeror is near success already or has only a toe hold on the offeree and
thus needs great success with the tender offer to achieve control.
The inability of shareholders to determine whether the offeror
really has resources with which to buy tendered shares has led to
insistence upon disclosure of sources of funds. Knowledge that the of-
feror has borrowed heavily to be able to pay for tendered shares may
indicate that once control of the offeree is achieved the burden of
servicing the debt may hurt the offeror's performance or that the
offeror may sell the target company's assets to cover the acquisition's
costs.
Although concern for uninformed shareholders contemplating
alternative responses may have led to the requirement that offerors
state their intentions regarding the target company, an equally impor-
tant factor was the fear of offerors as prospective corporate raiders who
plan to liquidate, loot, or, by some other aggressive scheme, profit from
target company assets.60 Whatever the cause of concern, the offeror's
statement of plans for the target company has produced difficulties for
both offerors and the judiciary. In Electronic Specialty Co. v. Inter-
national Controls Corp.,61 the offer provided that upon completion of
the offer, the offeror would "give consideration to a merger between
itself or a subsidiary and [the target]."62 The Second Circuit held that
the statement seemed "accurate" and that, in relation to the offeror's
failure to state the share-for-share basis in such a merger, "[i]t would be
59 See Senator Kuchel's remarks on a Swiss bank's blind tender for Columbia Motion
Picture Company shares. 113 CONG. REC. 858 (1967); Wall St. J., April 5, 1967, at 2, col. 2.
60 See 113 CONG. RFeC. 854-59 (1967). For tacit judicial disapproval of corporate raid-
ing, see Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
61 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969).
62 Ad. at 943.
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as serious an infringement of these regulations to overstate the definite-
ness of the plans as to understate them."6 3
Susquehanna Corporation's difficulty with disclosure of plans was
not such a simple matter. Susquehanna had stated that it planned no
major changes in the business or structure of target Pan American
Sulphur; Pan American was to be Susquehanna's natural resource arm.
Pan American, though, had recently sold Mexican properties for $58
million in cash. Testimony indicated that Susquehanna's president had
stated that Pan American was sitting on cash assets and that someone
could make better use of them. There was evidence that Susquehanna's
president was thinking of merging Pan American into American Smelt-
ing and Refining, which was then fighting off a tender offer by Penzoil
Corporation. Applying something of a res ipsa loquitur approach, an
SEC hearing examiner upheld SEC staff contentions that intention to
use a target's assets in an acquisition program must be disclosed even
though the offeror contemplates no specific acquisition, arguing that
plans need not "have reached the stage of possibly coming to fruition"
to require disclosure.6 4 Pan American filed suit to enjoin Susquehanna.
The district court shared the SEC's views and granted a preliminary
injunction;6 5 the Fifth Circuit reversed,66 holding that since the plan
for merger of Pan American and American Smelting never got off the
ground, Susquehanna's filing would have been misleading had Susque-
hanna mentioned a merger:
The person or corporation filing a Schedule 13D statement
need not necessarily walk a tortuous path. He must, of course, be
precise and forthright in making full and fair disclosure as to all
material facts called for by the various items of the schedule. At
the same time he must be careful not to delineate extravagantly or
to enlarge beyond reasonable bounds.67
63 Id. at 948.
64 Susquehanna Corp., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. Smc. L REP'. 77,741,
at 83,698 (SEC 1969). One commentator shows that many practitioners might run afoul of
the SEC staff's view as set forth in Susquehanna:
Since a statement of plans must often be formulated from outside the target
corporation on the basis of sketchy and often incomplete information, a course
of action ... may prove to be unworkable when full information from the target
corporation's records becomes available. Yet a change from stated plans may be
an open invitation for litigation ...
The practice that has actually developed in other advertisements demon-
strates cautious legal draftsmanship, similar to statements in a prospectus.
Emphasis throughout . . . is on present intention as contrasted with motive or
future intention.
Hamilton, supra note 4, at 283-84.
65 Pan Am. Sulphur Co. v. Susquehanna Corp., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH
FID. SEc. L. REP. 92,473 (W.D. Tex. 1969), rev'd, 423 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1970).
66 Susquehanna Corp. v. Pan Am. Sulphur Co., 423 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1970).
67 Id. at 1085.
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Quoting Electronic Specialty on overstatement in disclosure of plans,
the court led up to the conclusion that the district court decision was
"clearly erroneous" by saying:
Though the offeror has an obligation fairly to disclose its plans in
the event of a takeover, it is not required to make predictions of
future behavior, however tentatively phrased, which may cause the
offeree or the public investor to rely on them unjustifiably.68
The Fifth Circuit's decision is probably bad law. Although the
Pan American-American Smelting merger idea never got off the
ground, the existence of the idea, together with Pan American's large
cash holding, indicate that the offeror had in mind some change in
Pan American's structure. The court tacitly admitted as much:
It should be obvious to even the uninitiated that when a corpora-
,tion takes over control of another corporation having $60,000,000
in cash assets, some kind of change in the latter's business or corpo-
rate structure will likely occur some time in the future.69
Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit's opinion rather than the SEC's idea
about disclosure of plans represents the current judicial view in the
area.70 Such a view renders disclosure of plans nearly meaningless.
Certainly one primary aim of the legislation was to force disclosure of
an offeror's plans to use target assets as a stepping stone to further
acquisitions.71
Curiously, no affirmative disclosure requirements exist for an
American target corporation.72 Once target management does respond
to an offer, however, some requirements do come into play. Solicitations
or recommendations concerning acceptance or rejection of the offer
must be made in accordance with Commission rules.7- Currently, the
Commission requires that any communication regarding the offer must
be filed and must include the following items of background informa-
tion: identity, affiliation with either the offeror or the offeree, persons
employed to make such recommendations, and information on the
68 Id. at 1085-86.
69 Id. at 1085.
70 The Commission later expressed non-acquiescence in the Fifth Circuit result,
upholding the SEC hearing examiner's finding that Susquehanna's disclosure was inade-
quate. The Commission stated that neither "res judicata nor . . . collateral estoppel is
applicable because this Commission was not a party to the injunction suit or in privity
with any of the parties" and could not appeal. Since the case was of first impression, the
Commission's primary jurisdiction made imperative a decision by the SEC on the merits.
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8933, at 8 (July 17, 1970).
71 See text accompanying note 60 supra.
72 Disclosures may be required, however, in certain defensive situations. Text ac-
companying notes 82-83 infra.
73 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(d)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(4) (Supp. V, 1970).
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party's or its associates' transactions in the security within the last sixty
days.74
3. Terms of the Offer75
Under the seven-sixty-day rule of section 14(d)(5), target company
shareholders who have deposited securities pursuant to the offer may
withdraw the shares in the seven-day period following publication of
definitive copies of the offer and may also withdraw once sixty days
have elapsed from the date of publication. 70 This provision aims at
offerors who pressure shareholders into making a hurried decision on
tender. Under the seven-sixty-day rule, the offering circular must in-
form the shareholder that if he makes a tender during the first days of
the offer he can withdraw before the seven-day deadline. On the other
end, the sixty-day limitation serves to prevent offerors from delaying
deciding whether to take up tendered shares or to pay for shares once
taken up, and also to prevent offerors from leaving a tender offer open
interminably.
When making an offer for less than 100 percent of the target's
outstanding shares,77 the offeror frequently announced that shares
would be accepted in the order received, thereby forcing shareholders
to hurry their decision in fear that they might tender after the offeror
had reached the desired percentage. Section 14(d)(6), the pro rata-take-
up rule, provides that when the offer is for less than all of an outstand-
ing class of securities and the offer is oversubscribed, those securities
received by the offeror in the first ten days of the offer must be taken
up pro rata.78
74 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14d-4, 240.14d-101 (1970).
75 While Congress chose to follow the general disclosure philosophy underlying
federal regulation of proxy contests and public exchange offers, it recognized
that cash tender offers posed certain unique problems. Public Law 90-439
therefore goes considerably beyond disclosure in connection with cash tender
offers, and requires certain substantive changes in cash tender offer practice.
In a sense these provisions, designed to correct specific evils Congress thought
existed in current cash tender offer practices, constitute a code of "fair play"
in cash tender offers. While substantive regulation is unusual in federal securities
legislation, which in most other areas is based on the philosophy of full dis-
closure rather than substantive control, such regulation is not unknown.
Hamilton, supra note 4, at 274-75 (footnote omitted). By a recent amendment of § 14(d)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1984 these substantive changes have been made appli-
cable to exchange offers as well. Note 24 supra.
76 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (Supp. V, 1970).
77 Eighty percent is a frequent figure. Note 17 supra.
78 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (Supp. V, 1970). The New York Stock Exchange had a similar
requirement before the Williams Bill made such practice mandatory. NEw Yoax SToCK
ExcHACGE, ComAsY MANUAL, at A-180 (1963) provides: "After a minimum period of 10
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Finally, section 14(d)(7), the increase-in-consideration rule, re-
quires the offeror to pay increased consideration to all who have ten-
dered pursuant to the offer if the offeror has increased the offer
price.7 9 The pro rata-take-up rule also applies after an increase in con-
sideration 0 but the statute does not make it clear whether the seven-
sixty-day rule applies in such circumstances. 8'
4. Defensive Disclosure
The Williams Bill, section 13(e), gives the SEC power to regulate
a common tender offer defense, the purchase by the target company of
its own shares. 82 Thus far the Commission has chosen to regulate this
area in a limited manner.83 Essentially, before purchasing its own
shares after a tender offer has been made, a target company must dis-
close to the Commission and to its own shareholders the amount and
anticipated source of such purchases, whether they are made over an
exchange or directly from individuals, the purpose of such purchases,
and the source and amount of funds for such purchases, including
identification of parties to any borrowing involved.
5. Antifraud Rules
The last of the areas of American tender offer regulation is the
general antifraud proscription of section 14(e).84 Although phrased in
language similar to that found in rule lOb-5, 85 the tender offer provi-
days for the acceptance of shares on a pro rata basis, there is no objection to receiving
shares thereafter on a 'first-come first-served' basis."
70 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (Supp. V, 1970).
80 Id. § 78n(d)(6).
81 The cloudiness results from the express extension in § 14(d)(6) of the pro rata
rule to the 10 days following an increase in consideration. No such express extension
appears in the seven-sixty-day rule.
82 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e) (Supp. V, 1970), as amended, Pub. L. No. 91-567, § 2 (Dec. 22,
1970).
83 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Se-1 (1970).
84 It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they are made, not
misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or
practices, in connection with any tender offer or request or invitation for tenders,
or any solicitation of security holders in opposition to or in favor of any such
offer, request, or invitation.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (Supp. V, 1970). The recent amendments have added: "The Commission
shall, for the purposes of this subsection, by rules and regulations define, and prescribe
means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive,
or manipulative." Pub. L. No. 91-567, § 5 (Dec. 22, 1970), amending 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e)
(Supp. V, 1970).
85 It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
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sion applies to "any tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or
any solicitation of security holders in opposition to or in favor of any
such offer, request, or invitation," whereas lob-5 applies to practices "in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security." Notably, the "any
tender offer" language means that, unlike the other portions of the Wil-
liams Bill, the antifraud proscription is not limited to tenders for section
12 company shares. A more important result lies in section 14(e)'s varia-
tion from lob-5 in jurisdictional language.8 6 Cases adjudicated after the
passage of section 14(e), but involving causes of action arising before its
passage, illustrate that section 14(e) provides broader standing to sue
than does lOb-5;8 7 specifically, an action for an exchange offeror's
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of a national securities exchange,
b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1970).
From the birth of § 14(e), experts have speculated as to the intended effect of
language differences between it and rule 10b-5:
In testifying on the Williams Bill, Professor William Painter stated that he
found great confusion and no statutory pattern among the anti-fraud provisions
of the [1934] Act. He asked rhetorically whether any policy required different
standards under each and asked the committee to clarify whether the coverage
of lOb-5 and 14e was to be the same. That suggestion was not followed ....
Krasik, supra note 4, at 456-57 (footnote omitted). The courts have not yet noted any
difference other than standing. Note 86 infra.
86 The major difference between 14e and lOb-5 is the standing each grants.
Assuming the plaintiff has been deceived, orthodox lOb-5 theory, based on
Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., [193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 956 (1952)] requires that he be a purchaser or seller .... In Schoenbaum
v. Firstbrook, [268 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd, 405 F.2d 200, modified,
405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969)] the District Court
held that the plaintiff had stated no cause of action as to the tender offer
because he had not sold any shares pursuant to the offer.
Krasik, supra note 4, at 457 (footnotes omitted). The same author continues:
ifihe Court in Electronic Specialty said "The primary difference . . . is that
whereas 10b-5 has as its final phrase 'in connection with the purchase or sale of
[any] security,' 14e ends 'in connection with any tender offer ... '" After pointing
out possible harms to the [target] corporation and a non-tendering shareholder
from a fraudulent or deceptive offer, the court stated that either would have
standing under 14e. This conclusion is dearly the correct one.
Id. at 458 (footnotes omitted), quoting Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls
Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 945 n.6 (2d Cir. 1969).
87 In Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970), target Syracuse had defeated Iroquois's tender offer by
publicizing sham merger talks with a third company. Iroquois, according to the Second
Circuit, had no standing to object:
Iroquois is not here complaining that it was misled by the acts of defendants
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fraud, nondisclosure, or misleading statements can be grounded on
section 14(e) and need not involve the purchase or sale of a security.
In the pre-14(e) period, even with a purchase or sale-say, a sale
by a tendering shareholder-an action against the offeror for mislead-
ing statements could fail because offerors were not insiders. 8  Thus, the
shareholder dilemma resulting from the lack of affirmative disclosure
requirements was compounded by judicial refusal to apply lOb-5's
general disclosure principles to offerors.8 9 The uncertainty regarding
as to any purchases or sales by it of Syracuse China stock; indeed, its basic
complaint is that, because of the acts of defendants, it could not purchase such
shares....
That Congress enacted the new Section 14(e) to prohibit fraud by "any
person" in respect to tender offers is at least an indication that in tender offer
contests such as that at bar there was no standing to sue under Rule lOb-5 by
either the tender offeror or by the target corporation.
Id. at 967-69. The Second Circuit later adopted the view that standing would exist if the
act complained of had prevented the plaintiff from purchasing or selling a security. Crane
Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822
(1970). Other recent court of appeals decisions also contradict Iroquois's view on tender
offers and standing under lOb-5. E.g., Kahan v. Rosentiel, 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970). These cases form a part of the wider erosion of lOb-5's
purchase-sale requirement. Whatever Crane and Kahan portend, the erosion they signal is
unnecessary in the tender offer area because of the § 14(e) language, "in connection with
any tender offer."
88 One authority for that principle has been Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753,
764-65 (D.N.J. 1955):
The cases imposing a duty on the part of a purchaser of shares of stock to
disclose his knowledge of future prospects and plans all involve situations where
the purchaser holds a fiduciary position and where the knowledge has been
obtained by virtue of an "inside" position.
Nor did offerors attain insider status at any time during the course of the bid:
The contention is not justified that on September 7, 1948, when the letters
and option offers were mailed to the plaintiffs [offeree company shareholders],
any defendants occupied an inside position which would create any fiduciary
duty of disclosure on their part ....
... In short, the alleged scheme ...was conceived and prosecuted strictly
by "outsiders" upon whom there was no duty of disclosure.
Id. at 765. See Comment, The Regulation of Corporate Tender Offers Under Federal
Securities Law: A New Challenge for Rule 10-b5, 33 U. Cm. L. Rav. 359, 373 (1966)
("It is not dear that a duty to disclose exists at all, even though rule lOb-5 literally applies
to 'any person' "). See also Connelly v. Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49 (N.D. Ohio 1959), aff'd
per curiam, 279 F.2d 685 (6th Cir. 1960).
Compare the finding in Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970), that an ally of the offeree was an insider. The
point that an offeror does not become an insider during the course of an offer cannot be
considered settled. If the offeror does become an insider after it makes the offer or when a
certain number of tenders are received, then there are interesting questions about what
§ 14(e) and lOb-5 would require the offeror to disclose over and above the requirements
of the Williams Bill provisions.
89 See Kennedy, Tender Moment, 23 Bus. LAw. 1091, 1105 n.57 (1968). The cases cited
therein show how plaintiffs unsuccessfully pressed for judicial recognition that lOb-5
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the existence of lOb-5 remedies in tender offers contributed to enact-
ment of section 14(e). Although remedying threshold problems regard-
ing standing to sue and identity of insiders, the new antifraud provision
does nothing more than carry lOb-5 principles over into the tender
offer area. 0
6. Other Federal Regulation
In addition to the Williams Bill, there are other federal regula-
tions pertaining to tender offers. One of these is rule lOb-13,91 prohibit-
ing market purchases by the offeror. The Commission first proposed a
rule that would require an offeror to pay to all tenderers the highest
price paid in the market if the offeror had made market purchases of
target company stock during the course of a tender offer.92 Later the
Commission revised the proposal into a prohibition of all offeror
market purchases of target company shares. 93 The rationale was that
payment of a higher market price is unfair to those who have tendered,
and payment of a lower than bid price in market purchases is also
unfair because of the possibility of fewer tendered shares being taken
up, or even rescission of the offer should sufficient shares be obtained
in the market.9 4
B. Exchange Offers and the 1933 Act
As noted earlier, exchange offers are also covered by the Securities
Act of 1933.95 The vast body of law developed under the 1933 Act
dictates that the shares offered to target shareholders be registered with
the Securities and Exchange Commission and that, in conformity with
section 5, a prospectus complying with statutory requirements be
required of offerors disclosure of the very items that the Williams Bill provisions require
today.
90 Because 14e specifically covers a tender offer, the question arises what role, if
any, Rule lOb-5 and the body of law developed under it can play in this field.
The case of Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp. indicates
that lOb-5 and 14e will be held to work together.
Krasik, supra note 4, at 456 (footnote omitted).
91 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-13 (1970).
92 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8391 (Aug. 30, 1968).
93 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8595 (May 5, 1969).
The prohibition would continue from the earliest announcement of the offer or the
commencement of the offer until the time the tendered securities may be accepted or
rejected by the offeror under the terms of the offer.
94 Rule lOb-13 became effective as revised on November 10, 1969. SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 8712 (Oct. 8, 1969). For a critical appraisal see Lowenfels,
Rule lOb-13, Rule lOb-6 and Purchases of Target Company Securities During an Exchange
Offer, 69 COLUM. L. Rxv. 1392 (1969).
95 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1964).
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delivered to the offeree shareholders. 96 Registration, of course, demands
extensive disclosure about the offeror's past, present, and future affairs.
Much of that disclosure is included in the prospectus.
When the offeror decides to use the stock method, the Securities
Act and the regulations thereunder strictly circumscribe what can or
cannot be said. Section 5(c) of the Act states: "It shall be unlawful for
any person.., to offer to sell or offer to buy through the use or medium
of any prospectus or otherwise any security, unless a registration state-
ment has been fied as to such security . . ."7 Rule 135, however,
allows the offeror to make certain limited disclosures before registra-
tion, including:
(2) A notice to any class of security holders.., that it proposes
to offer its securities to them in exchange for other securities
presently held by such security holders ....
(b) Such notice shall be sent not more than 60 days prior to
... the proposed date of the initial offering of the securities.
(c) The notice shall state that the offering will be made only
by means of a prospectus which will be furnished to such security
holders ... and shall contain no more than the following additional
information:
(1) The name of the issuer;
(2) The title of the securities proposed to be offered; [and]
(4) In the case of an exchange offering, the name of the issuer
and the title of the securities to be surrendered in exchange for the
securities to be offered, the basis upon which the exchange is pro-
posed to be made and the period during which the exchange may
be made .... 98
These items are the outer limits of disclosure allowed before a regis-
tration statement is filed. Exceeding the limits is popularly known as
"gun-jumping," a major sin in Amercan securities offerings. 99
In Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp.,100 Bangor
Punta announced to target Piper Aircraft shareholders that an ex-
change offer would be forthcoming. In holding that Bangor Punta had
96 Id. § 77e. Often the investor receives the prospectus after he has purchased the
securities or tendered in response to the exchange offer. Section 5(b) of the 1933 Act
requires in effect that a statutory prospectus only precede or accompany the confirmation
slip sent after the sale has been made or after the security has been delivered. WHFAT
REPORT 106-26 deals with this and related problems.
97 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1964).
98 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.135(a)-(c) (1970).
99 See, e.g., SEC v. Arvida Corp., 169 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
100 426 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1970).
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violated section 5 by announcing that the value of the hybrid securities
package to be offered was eighty dollars, the Second Circuit stated:
It is enough to point out that... the SEC had no way of checking
the honesty of the figure, and that the public did not receive the
detailed information it would have received from a prospectus is-
sued after a registration statement had been filed. 01
After filing a registration statement, the offeror can only make a
written offer by means of a statutory prospectus.10 2 Before the registra-
tion's effective date, the offeror uses the section 10(b), or "red herring,"
prospectus, an abbreviated version of the registration statement. The
red herring is an offer to sell, but no sale can be made until the regis-
tration statement becomes effective. 10 Only after the effective date,
which may be from five weeks to three months or more after filing,104
does the actual exchange offer begin. The offeror must make available
to each offeree shareholder a final prospectus which is customarily
delivered with the confirmation of the exchange.
C. State Regulation
Two American states, Virginia and Ohio, have additional regula-
tion for cash offers, imposing more stringent substantive requirements
if the target is a Virginia or an Ohio corporation. Both states follow the
federal pattern as to filing and disclosure. The significant departure
from the federal pattern in the Virginia statute involves timing.10 5 An
offeror seeking control of a Virginia company must file its disclosure
statement ten days before making the offer, as compared with the
federal requirement that the offeror only file simultaneously with the
offer's implementation. A second major difference
concerns the period during which the shareholder is bound by the
tender offer, and cannot withdraw any of the tendered shares....
The Virginia statute allows for the withdrawal of shares at any time
during the first twenty-one days of the take-over bid. This twenty-
one day period, coupled with the ten day waiting period, would al-
low incumbent management thirty-one days from the time they
were first notified of the impending bid until any of their share-
holders would be bound in their tender to the offeror: thirty-one
days in which to oppose the insurgents. In addition to the twenty-
one day withdrawal provision, the Virginia statute also provides
'0' Id. at 575.
102 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(b)-(c) (1964).
103 Id. §§ 77j(a)-(b).
104 That is, after the SEC has inspected the registration statement and after the
offeror has amended the statement.
105 VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-531 (Supp. 1970).
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that no take-over bid may last longer than thirty-five days. These
two provisions cut the effective duration of a take-over bid to
fourteen days, for it is only between the twenty-first and thirty-
fifth days that the offeror can collect binding tenders from the
shareholders. 106
The Ohio legislation also has a ten-day waiting period.107 Ohio also
requires that anyone owning more than five percent of a class of an
Ohio company's stock must state his intention to take over the company
to anyone for whom he purchases stock within a year prior to the bid.
Obviously, these Ohio provisions favor incumbent managements by
virtually eliminating the tender offeror's ability to make a surprise bid.
Both states' statutes may be products of management's fear of
being taken over by a corporate raider. However, they also may reflect
a belief that the tender offer process must be slowed down so that the
outcome of a bid does not depend on how successfully either party can
scramble in a few days time. Whether or not the means used by Ohio
and Virginia for slowing down the tender offer process are the right
ones, their actions may be the start of a trend towards similar regula-
tion in other states.
On the state level, as on the federal level, the exchange offer is
subject to registration regulations. State blue sky laws require registra-
tion of the securities to be offered target shareholders. Although this is
often a simple process of proving to state security commissioners that
the securities have been registered with the SEC under the 1933 Act,ls
the task may be voluminous: the process must be repeated in each state
where target shareholders reside. And state requirements can subject
the offer to added risks, namely, the state commissioners' power to pass
on the fairness of the offer. In General Host Corporation's fight for
Armour Packing, General Host complied with the federal full dis-
closure requirements by registering the securities to be offered Armour
stockholders. Of course, the federal regulatory scheme does not pass on
fairness: full disclosure is made and the investor to whom the security is
offered judges the offering's fairness for himself. Two states, however,
blocked General Host's offer in their jurisdictions by exercising the
fairness power. The Wisconsin Commissioner of Securities
stated that the exchange offer was unfair and inequitable to Armour
stockholders because the cash flow of General Host appeared in-
100 Comment, Take-Over Bids in Virginia, 26 WASH. & Lxz L. REV. 328, 382 (1969).
The comment concludes that preemption and supremacy clause doctrines do not prevent
states from adding to the federal tender offer regulations. Id. at 384.
107 OHio Rv. CODE ANN. § 1707.041 (Page Supp. 1970).
108 This process is known as coordination. See, e.g., UNnrotm Sactuunm ACr § 808.
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sufficient to cover the interest requirements on the debentures that
would be outstanding if the exchange offer succeeded....
. Although [the Commissioner's] office found that the Gen-
eral Host prospectus fully disclosed the material terms of the ex-
change offer, it also found that the offer did not appear fair and
equitable, which resulted in the order denying registration of the
securities. 09
Such state action can slow down the exchange offer process. State
commissioners often disallow registration in ex parte proceedings
brought by the target company. Even if the offeror is successful in
having the commissioner vacate his order, the time required for hearing
and decision may deprive the offeror of advantages it might otherwise
have had.
D. Stock Exchange Regulation
Beneath the first level of federal regulation and the second level
of state regulation lies a third tier in American tender offer regulation
-self-regulation. The New York Stock Exchange, for example, re-
quires listed companies that become offerors to give all target stock-
holders an opportunity to participate equally in the offer.110 The
Exchange's requirements, like Virginia's and Ohio's statutes, also reflect
a belief that the tender offer process should not be so hurried: "While
it is desirable that a period of about 30 days be used, a tender offer
should remain open for a minimum of 10 days . . . ."1 Further, the
Exchange demands that if an unusual or exceptional circumstance
presents itself, the offeror must discuss the bid with the Exchange's
representatives." 2
III
OUTLINE OF BRITISH SECURITIES REGULATION
British company law is largely consensual, having evolved from
partnership law."13 American corporate law has been largely restrictive,
109 Release of Wisconsin Office of Commissioner of Securities, 3 BLUE SKY L. REP.
70,805, at 66,809 (1969). A federal court held that the contentions of unfairness were
based on the offer's financial merits and not on fraudulent or misleading statements or
omissions. Armour & Co. v. General Host Corp., 296 F. Supp. 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). See also
Northwest Indus., Inc., 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 70,816 (Ohio Dep't of Commerce 1969).
110 NEW YORK STocK EXcHANGE, supra note 78, at A-179.
111 Id. at A-180.
112 Id. For a current summary and commentary by the New York Stock Exchange's
President, see Haack, Take-Overs and Tenders: A Stock Exchange Viewpoint, 25 Bus.
LAw. 931 (1970).
113 See Gower, Some Contrasts Between British and American Corporation Law, 69
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although many states are moving more and more towards enabling acts
which, like British company law, allow consensual arrangements to be
the law for closely-held corporations. 14 A similar distinction holds true
for British and American securities regulation. The pervasive American
regulatory scheme, comprised of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, rules and
regulations under those Acts, the SEC, the state statutes, and the courts,
is restrictive, encompasses most transactions, and is governmentally
imposed. Such a network has no counterpart in England. A govern-
mental scheme for securities regulation exists, but a party can opt to
join many self-regulating groups. Membership in such groups removes
the member from governmental regulation and the associations or
groups themselves are not regulated by government. Indeed, like
British company law, British securities regulation is consensual in the
sense that self-regulation provides the actual law for the association or
group.
A. The Statutes
At first blush, the British securities regulation system does resem-
ble the American. There are two statutes: the Companies Act of 1948115
and the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act of 1958.116 The former,
like the American 1933 Act, governs initial offerings of securities; the
latter, like the 1934 Act, governs subsequent dealings in those securi-
ties." 7 A regulatory agency, the Board of Trade Companies Depart-
ment, administers the statutes and the rules promulgated thereunder.
The Registrar of Companies, an official within the Board of Trade,
functions much like an American secretary of state in the incorporation
process, receiving both the articles and memorandum of association for
filing. Yet, as will be seen, this seemingly parallel scheme applies to
H v. L. REv. 1369, 1371-72 (1956). On the subject of British company law, see L. GowER,
THE PmcniLm oF MODERN COMPANY LAW (3d ed. 1969); R. PENNINGrON, COMPANY LAW (2d
ed. 1967); Peppiatt, British and American Business Law: A Brief Comparison, 16 Bus. LAw.
54 (1960).
114 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 341-56 (Supp. 1968); N.Y. Bus. CoRe. LAw §§ 608-09,
614, 616-17, 620, 708-09 (McKinney 1963). See generally R. BAKa & W. CAREY, Co~PoaTIoNs
862-512 (4th ed. 1969); Cary, How Illinois Corporations May Enjoy Partnership Advantages,
48 Nw. U.L. Rlrv. 427 (1953); Hall, The New Maryland Close Corporation Law, 27 MD. L.
REv. 341 (1967); Israels, The Close Corporation and the Law, 33 CoMMu L.Q. 488 (1948);
O'Neal, Developments in the Regulation of the Close Corporation, 50 CoMa.L L.Q. 641
(1965).
115 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38 [hereinafter cited as Companies Act]. The Companies Act
of 1967, c. 81, supplements the basic 1948 statute.
116 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c. 45 [hereinafter cited as Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act].
117 See Stacy, Company Law Administration: The Companies Department of the
Board of Trade, 58 L. Soc'Y GAz. 485, 488 (1961).
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only about five percent of the United Kingdom's investment trans-
actions."18
Fundamental to understanding British securities regulation is the
knowledge that virtually no over-the-counter market exists in Eng-
land."19 Before raising capital in a public offering, a company must
obtain a quotation on a recognized stock exchange.120 Hence, any corpo-
ration of consequence has a listed issue. Again, company law governs
the original marketing of securities. There are Companies Act provi-
sions for registration through filing, disclosure, and prospectuses. 12'
But the Act exempts from filing and prospectus requirements offerings
made through a member of a recognized stock exchange if the offering
comports with the exchange's rules. 22 Since in the absence of an over-
the-counter market an issue must be listed before being offered to the
public, most offerings will comply with exchange requirements, and
need not follow company law procedure for offerings. Consequently,
public offerings in the United Kingdom become largely a matter of
self-regulation.
The significant feature of the Prevention of Fraud (Investments)
Act is the command that all communications with shareholders, other
than between an issuer and its own members, must be made through
certain designated channels. 12 These channels are dealers in securities
licensed by the Board of Trade and brokers or firms who are members
of a recognized stock exchange, a recognized association, or an entity
that has been exempted by the Board of Trade.124 If the communica-
118 Gower, supra note 113, at 1381-82; text accompanying note 147 infra.
119 Gower, supra note 113, at 1381.
120 "The over-the-counter market scarcely exists. And in practice no public offering
can be made without obtaining a quotation for the shares on one or more of the recognized
stock exchanges, nearly always including London." Id. "The general public will not
normally subscribe an issue which is not quoted, and this experience places the Stock
Exchange in a commanding position." Schmitthoff, The Issue of Securities in Great
Britain, 1969 J. Bus. L. 1, 8.
121 Companies Act §§ 37-46, 55, 417-23, sched. 4 (provisions dealing with public
offerings). See generally Cole, Morley & Scott, Corporate Financing in Great Britain, 12
Bus. LAw. 324 (1957); Schmitthoff, Issue of Securities in Great Britain, 1969 J. Bus. L. 1.
122 Companies Act § 38. For prospectus requirements see id. sched. 4. The exchanges
have stringent rules that go far beyond the standards dictated by company law. Cf.
COMMITTEE OF THE FED'N OF STOCK EXCHANGES IN GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND, ADMISsION
OF SECURITIEs TO QUOTATION (1966) [hereinafter cited as ADMISSION TO QUOTATION].
123 Thus, Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act § 1 makes it unlawful to carry on
a securities business unless the enterprise so doing falls within certain categories defined
by the Act.
124 Those entities falling into one or the other approved category are listed in
BOARD oF TRADE, PARTiCULARs OF DEALERS IN SECURITIES AND UNIT TRusTs (1970), a publica.
don prepared annually.
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tion invites one to purchase or dispose of securities and is made through
a licensed dealer in securities, the circular or announcement must be
filed with the Board of Trade; 125 furthermore, the communication must
comply with the Board of Trade's regulations, the Licensed Dealers
(Conduct of Business) Rules.126 But dealers in securities are the only
persons who have to file with the Board of Trade and follow the Board
of Trade guidelines. The rest of the financial community is self-
regulated because the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act exempts
the other authorized channels from the Act's filing and disclosure
requirements. If the broker or institution is a member of a prescribed
stock exchange or recognized association, or is exempted by the Board
of Trade, it does not have to comply with the Act and the Licensed
Dealers Rules as to form and filing of circulars.127 Instead, the broker or
institution comports with stock exchange or association rules. Hence,
the Act, which is the governmental device for regulation of subsequent
dealings in securities, directly touches only those few transactions that
had no connection with a stock exchange.12
B. The Stock Exchanges
The United Kingdom has some ten stock exchanges. 129 Of these,
the principal ones belong to the Federation of Stock Exchanges in
Great Britain and Ireland, formed in 1965.180 The federated exchanges
have formulated a uniform body of regulations, contained in a series
of memoranda, on marketing and on subsequent dealings in securi-
125 Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act § 14.
126 The Board of Trade's Authority to promulgate and enforce those rules is found in
id. § 7.
127 Id. § 14.
128 Section 13 is the only statutory restraint applying to all British subjects, including
issuers themselves and the channels through which those issuers are required to act.
Under this section anyone inducing another to enter into a securities transaction by means
of misleading statements, promises, or forecasts is subject to civil and criminal penalties.
129 R. PENNINMTON, .supra note 82, at 305. In addition to the London Exchange,
provincial exchanges include the Scottish Stock Exchange, the Belfast Exchange, the
Northern Stock Exchange, Dublin, Cork, and Greenock Exchanges, the Midlands and
Western Exchange, and the Provincial Brokers Stock Exchange, with headquarters at
York but with dealings among members throughout the country. Recent combinations
such as the 1963 consolidation of the Glasgow, Edinburgh, Aberdeen, and Dundee Ex-
changes into the Scottish Stock Exchange have reduced the number of British exchanges
from 22 to 10. The exchanges listed herein are the recognized exchanges for Prevention
of Fraud (Investments) Act purposes. Id. at 806 n.
130 Id. at 595. Members are London, Northern, Scottish, Belfast, Birmingham, Bristol,
Cardiff, Cork, Dublin, Nottingham, Swansea, and Provincial Brokers Exchanges. Further
consolidation may occur, as studies are being undertaken on the feasibility of one exchange,
with all present exchanges becoming branches. See The Times (London), Aug. 8, 1969, at
28, col. 1.
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ties.181 Given the importance of exchange regulation and the volume on
the federated exchanges, the memoranda containing these regulations
affect much of the dealing in British securities.
Much of the self-regulation, tantamount to British securities law,
emanates from the "City." This is an amorphous body, roughly equiva-
lent to the American Wall Street, centered around the London Stock
Exchange and composed of investment bankers, the London Exchange
and the Stock Exchange Federation, institutional investors' associations,
alliances of industry, and a few other organizations that speak on
behalf of various interests in the securities business. One reason
for the City's dominance is that the absence of an over-the-counter
market causes the financial community to be concentrated near the
exchanges; another reason is the overall dominance of the London Stock
Exchange, far surpassing in volume all other British exchanges.13 2
Besides the memoranda of the Stock Exchange Federation, much of
the regulation emanating from the City, as the seat of the British
financial community, is directed by the various associations in govern-
ing their respective memberships. 33
C. Company Law
Certain provisions of company law can play a role in the securities
field and in takeover bids. Principal among those provisions is the
power of the Board of Trade to appoint an inspector, either on the
Board's own motion or on petition of two hundred shareholders or
one-tenth of a corporation's membership, to investigate the affairs of
a company should suspicious conduct be evidenced. 34 The inspector's
131 ADMISSION TO QUOTATION.
132 In 1969 the dollar volume of all transactions on the London Exchange was 20.9
billion with about 9,400 issues traded. On the next largest British exchange, the Scottish
at Glasgow, the 1969 dollar volume was 722 million. Central Statistical Office, Financial
Statistics No. 88, at 107 (Jan. 1970). The valuation placed on 1969 New York Stock Exchange
transactions was 129.6 billion; the American Stock Exchange volume for the same year was
50.1 billion. SEC, Statistical Bulletin 11 (March 1970).
133 That regulation will generally be beyond the scope of this article. But, as seen
from the discussion of public offerings and of the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act,
membership in an association or recognized stock exchange bestows exemption from
much governmental control. Naturally, then, members would prize their participation in
an association; conversely, the association, with the power of expulsion, could wield
considerable influence over its members. To date the various associations have not done
so. See text accompanying notes 176-77 infra. See also The Times (London), July 18, 1967,
at 17, col. 2.
134 Companies Act §§ 164-75; see Gower, supra note 113, at 1387-89. Stacy, supra
note 117, at 487, explains the Companies Department procedure in handling requests,
which includes, inter alia, a chance for directors to respond to the charges before the
appointment of an inspector. The appointment procedure can, however, take as little as
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report is then published. Since investigation seems to carry with it
considerable notoriety in both the financial community and the pop-
ular press, publication of the report, even in the absence of further
Board of Trade action, is a strong deterrent.135 Appointment of an
inspector can also be on indication that an unknown buyer is pur-
chasing the company's shares with the apparent purpose of influencing
control; the inspector's only task is to bring the unknown buyer into
the open.85
Companies must maintain a register of members for general
public inspection, and provide copies upon request. A company must
honor such a request within ten days, or a court order will summarily
issue.8 7 Another relevant company law provision gives the right to
a member, upon alleging oppressive conduct by majority shareholders
or management, to petition a court for such regulation of the com-
pany's affairs as the court thinks fit.38  The remedy may not be effective
in a takeover situation since the provision envisions a constant course
of conduct rather than one act of malfeasance, although a court may
denominate as oppressive a series of events culminating in a tender
offer.8 9 Last of the especially relevant company law provisions is the
section on compulsory buying out of a minority.140 Once a party ac-
quires ninety percent of the target corporation's voting shares, that
party can by statutory procedure acquire the shares remaining in other
hands. Likewise, a minority of less than ten percent can force the
ninety percent holder to purchase the minority's shares.
It is important to note that case law in the British securities field
four days. Stacy also points out that the purpose of an inspector is to discover details that
cannot otherwise be elicited, not to circumscribe an exercise of discretion by directors
which was unpopular with shareholders. Id. For a case involving the appointment of an
inspector in a takeover situation, see Gower, Corporate Control: The Battle for the
Berkeley, 68 HARv. L. REv. 1176 (1955).
185 E.g., note the resistance to the appointment of an inspector in Leasco-Pergamon
Press, text accompanying note 270 infra. "Board of Trade inspectors examined the affairs
of more companies in 1969 than in any of the last 10 years." The Times (London), Feb. 19,
1970, at 21, col. 6. Twenty-six inspectors were appointed in 1969, 16 in 1968.
186 Companies Act § 172; ci. the American regulation providing that unless a five
percent position is acquired, a shareholder need not reveal his identity or purpose. Text
accompanying notes 45-46 supra.
18T Companies Act §§ 110-23 (provisions relating to register of members). Section 113
provides that the list must be presented upon payment of two shillings for every 100 words.
188 Id. § 210.
189 See Gower, Corporate Control: The Battle for the Berkeley, 68 HAlv. L. R Ev. 1176,
1183 & n.23 (1956).
140 Companies Act § 209. Cf. DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (Supp. 1968). For a detailed
treatment of § 209, see Pennington, Takeover Bids in the United Kingdom, 17 Ax. J.
ComP. L. 159, 182-89 (1969).
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is virtually nonexistent. First of all, most regulation is self-imposed,
with no private rights of action obtaining.14' Second, even if there is
a violation of a statutory provision of universal application, the share-
holder often chooses to be vindicated without expense to himself by
petitioning for a Board of Trade investigation. The threat of a publi-
cized report alone leads to many settlements. 142 Third, the derivative
action is unknown in English law, all litigation being representative. 143
The final factor is the British ethical proscription against the contin-
gent fee, forcing a shareholder to pay a retainer to the solicitor em-
ployed-an expensive prospect for one challenging a rich, resourceful
corporation.144
IV
BRITISH TENDER OFFER REGULATION1
4 5
Licensed dealers must submit to the Board of Trade all circulars
asking investors to dispose of shares. Hence, the Board has promulgated
standards governing the content and distribution of such circulars,
necessarily including tender offer communications. These standards,
the Licensed Dealers (Conduct of Business) Rules, 146 also govern take-
over conduct to some extent. Yet since securities dealers or investment
advisers belonging to a recognized stock exchange do not have to be
licensed, and since most issues are listed, fewer than five percent of all
brokers, dealers, financial advisory firms, or investment bankers come
under the aegis of the Licensed Dealers Rules.147
The one area in which the Rules have widespread influence is
141 Gower, supra note 113, at 1382; Loss, The Fiduciary Concept as Applied to Trad-
ing by Corporate "Insiders" in the United States, 33 MoDm-q L. Ray. 34 (1970).
142 See Stacy, supra note 117, at 487.
143 There is little use, for example, in talking of shareholder action as a major
deterrent in a country whose Bar views as anathema the contingent fee that has
made viable instruments out of both the shareholder's derivative suit and the
non-derivative class action in the United States.
Loss, supra note 141, at 84.
144 See Gower, supra note 113, at 1385.
145 The only comprehensive, current work in the area is Pennington, Takeover Bids
in the United Kingdom, 17 Am. J. Comp,. L. 159 (1969). Pennington's article reviews cash
and stock tender offer regulations, compulsory buyouts of minority shares, and antitrust
considerations. The article does not, however, delve into the history of British regulation,
nor does it deal with the important Leasco-Pergamon Press affair or attempt any British-
American comparison.
146 [1960] 1 STAT. INSTR. 886 (No. 1216).
147 6 L. Loss, supra note 4, at 3650-51. The Licensed Dealers Rules are discussed in
id. at 8650-52; due to their relative insignificance the Rules will not be summarized here.
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the content of bid circulars. Most institutions have, since 1960, volun-
tarily fashioned takeover circulars in accordance with the Rules.148
Since 1965 the Stock Exchange Federation has set out the Licensed
Dealers Rules' requirements as to content of circulars in the Federa-
tion memoranda, making the Rules' requirement mandatory for mem-
bers of federated exchanges. The City Code on Take-Overs and
Mergers,149 as the principal self-regulatory instrument in the tender
offer area, has provisions on disclosure in offer documents, yet those
requirements are not comprehensive; rather, their tenor evinces an
underlying assumption that a circular will comply with the Licensed
Dealers Rules. Compliance with the Rules in this respect has the force
of something akin to a customary rule of law. °0
A. Regulatory Development
Extensive British experience in the tender offer area dates from
World War II. There is no statutory merger or consolidation pro-
cedure;' 8 ' the most widespread acquisition technique is the takeover
bid. If of a friendly variety, the offer will be accompanied by the
offeree board of directors' recommendation. The two managements
may even negotiate as to offer price and terms of the takeover, often
with the offeror examining the target company's books.8 2
Business amalgamation of this type first reached great popularity
in Great Britain in the early 1950's. After the war, the Labor govern-
ment had urged dividend restraint; even after the restraints had weak-
ened, many complacent boards had not yet raised dividends, at least
not in accordance with earnings gains.1' Since British investors have
148 Pennington, supra note 140, at 161.
149 ISSUING HOUSES ASS'N, Crry CODE ON TAXE-OvERs AND MERGERS (rev. ed. 1969)
[hereinafter cited as Crry CODE].
150 Ethical and professional considerations seem to have much force in the British
financial community, partly because these were for many years the principal means of
regulation. Perhaps also because of the localized nature of the market and because of the
fear of governmental regulation being imposed, public censure or adverse publicity is
quickly generated and quickly heeded.
Despite the relative insignificance of the British Licensed Dealers Rules, American
writers have pointed to the Rules, or at least the British experience in the area of tender
offers, as an example of a well-established regulatory system. See 6 L. Loss, supra note 4, at
3649-54; Fleischer & Mundheim, supra note 6, at 326. As noted earlier, such assertions are
misleading. Text accompanying note 9 supra.
151 Note 10 supra.
152 American corporations do use the tender offer to achieve amicable amalgamation.
In American parlance, however, tender offer usually conjures up visions of a hotly-contested
fight.
153 Gower, supra note 139, at 1176; Penrose, supra note 11, at 147-48. Penrose's article
summarizes the pre-1964 history in the area.
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always been more conscious of yield than of growth,154 shareholders
became more willing to listen to offers for shares. In addition, British
accounting practice helped spur a takeover boom. Capital assets in
Britain can be revalued, with the increase in value available as a
source for bonug shares or even cash dividends.1 5 Post-war inflation
had left corporations with assets carried at a fraction of their worth.
Market prices, based largely on yields, did not reflect these hidden
values. Following takeover, offerors would thus be in a position to
generate earnings and dividends by selling or revaluing assets.
Adverse public opinion in the British amalgamation boom first
arose not in reaction to offerors' conduct, but from indignation at the
defense tactics of target companies' managements. 156 In pre-war days,
the bid was generally first made to the offeree company board. After
the war, with so many companies launching acquisition programs,
incumbent managements became less receptive to suitors. Aggressor
companies countered with secrecy, surprise, and pressure through rapid
development of bids. Incumbent management in turn developed sophis-
ticated defenses against offerors. At that point the financial press,
government officials, and others voiced criticism aimed at the no-
holds-barred defenses against offers. When regulation came, it was
naturally aimed at the controversy that had provoked public concern-
defenses. British self-regulation as a result still contains severe restric-
tions on tender offer defense tactics. 15 7
The first attempt at regulation came in 1959 when The Notes on
Amalgamations of British Businesses were drafted by the various City
institutions at the behest of the Governor of the Bank of England.
Although the Notes were to serve only as guidelines, commentators
151 Knauss, Securities Regulation-A Comparison of Practice and Purpose, 62 Am.
Soc'Y INT'L L. PRO. 131, 140 (1969).
155 Companies Act §§ 147-63 neither prohibits nor permits the revaluation of a
capital asset. See R. PENNINGTON, supra note 32, at 831. See also CrY CODE rule 15.
156 One such tactic is chronicled in Gower, supra note 189, at 1177. There, defending
management conveyed the target company's principal asset, the Berkeley Hotel, to a newly-
formed corporation. By then issuing the new company's voting stock to the Savoy pension
fund, of which Savoy directors were trustees, target management put the hotel beyond any
offeror's reach.
157 Penrose, supra note 11, at 153. Two of the four major revisions in the British self-
regulation scheme, those in 1959 and 1967, were direct results of resentment toward
bizarre defense strategies. In contrast, the United States Government intervened at an
earlier point in the development of tender offer techniques-when offerors began to
develop their arsenals but before target company defense reached today's level of
sophistication. Thus, the American legislation was the result of dissatisfaction with offerors'
tactics. Note 36 and accompanying text supra. The American legislation does not in any
significant way control target company conduct, either by restricting defenses or by
requiring disclosure.
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nevertheless thought of them as a sufficient curative. The theme of the
guidelines was the desirability of giving investors sufficient information
upon which to make a decision, while leaving companies and securities
people free from the yoke of regulation. On that basis, the Notes were
[a] sensible, concise and well-written document. ... The Govern-
ment in framing new corporate legislation should take note and
should not be deflected from its course of giving the economy free-
dom to grow because of an occasional rascal or a discreditable
episode.168
Time proved, however, that the parties to a takeover frequently dis-
regarded the guidelines. Inevitably, some of the black sheep were
members of the various institutions that had drafted them.159
In 1963 the Revised Notes on Amalgamations and Mergers sup-
planted the earlier document as the expression of the financial com-
munity's standards. The Revised Notes, too, were on many occasions
ignored. Despite the improvement in content after four years' ex-
perience, they had technical flaws.160 They were ineffective, however,
not because of technical fault, but because the principles were not
mandatory and there existed no independent or quasi-independent
agency for surveillance and enforcement. The drafting associations
were too close to the violators-usually members and their clients-
to press for obedience.
In the interim between publication of the Notes and the Revised
Notes, the Company Law (Jenkins) Committee had presented its re-
port to Parliament. 101 After describing the regulatory web formed by
the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act and the Licensed Dealers
Rules, the Committee recommended statutory authority for extension
of similar Board of Trade control to all takeover bids.162 The Commit-
108 193 ECONOMIST 440, 441 (1959).
159 One news article in reflecting on the years of self-regulation said: "With the main
contributors to the [Notes], bankers, investment managers, and Stock Exchange, as passive
onlookers, it was hardly surprising that companies tended to ignore the Rules." The Times
(London), March 27, 1968, at 27, col. 1.
160 Pennington, supra note 140, at 170-72, lists three faults, and implies that these
faults were the principal reasons for the new scheme. For opinions that lack of a
watchdog, not technical fault, had impaired earlier regulatory efforts, see The Times
(London), July 17, 1967, at 21, col. 1; id., July 18, 1967, at 23, col. 2; id., July 20, 1967,
at 21, col. 3.
161 BOARD OF TRADE, REPORT OF THE CoMwANY l LAw CommnsrrEE §§ 265-94 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as JENKINS CoMM. REPORT].
162 Id. § 272. "[R]ules . . . should apply to all take-over offers irrespectively of the
status of the person by or through whom they are made .... Id. § 270, at 101. "The scope
of the regulations which would be made under the Jenkins recommendations by the Board
of Trade would be wider than that of the present rules. The regulations would apply to
everyone, as distinct from special classes ... ." Penrose, supra note 11, at 152.
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tee also advocated that rule-making in the takeover area be placed in
the Board of Trade.165 As events subsequent to the 1963 publication
of the Revised Notes demonstrate, the 1962 Jenkins Committee recom-
mendations carried great weight. The Companies Act of 1967164 in-
corporated much of the Jenkins Committee Report in revising and
amending company law. Undoubtedly, then, the recommendation of
governmental regulation prompted the City to shore up self-regulatory
efforts and even to write the Revised Notes themselves. But Parliament
never reached the Jenkins Committee recommendations on takeover
bids,1 5 leaving open the possibility that it might take up the recom-
mendations at a later date. So in 1967 the Jenkins Committee recom-
mendations continued to challenge the City to put its house in order.100
In July 1967 the Metal Industries Ltd. defense against a take-
over bid enraged the financial press. Metal Industries had already suc-
cumbed to a takeover bid from Aberdare Holdings Ltd. when it issued
a block of shares to another suitor to divest Aberdare of control.167 In
163 JENKNS Comm. REPoRT § 272.
164 Companies Act of 1967, c. 81.
165 Parliament considered the Jenkins Committee recommendations on a piece-by-
piece basis. When an allotted number of topics had been covered, Parliament then enacted
the Companies Act of 1967, and scheduled consideration of the remaining recommendations
for future sessions:
The Board of Trade may also be reluctant to move [in the takeover area] because
a new Companies Bill, into which provisions for an SEC would most conveniently
fit, is not scheduled until the 1969-1970 session. The new Bill would cover the last
recommendations of the 1962 Jenkins Committee on Company Law, part of which
was carried out in last year's Act. But such are the pressures on the time both of
Parliament itself and the parliamentary draughtsmen ....
228 ECONOMIST, July 1968, at 74.
166 The Jenkins Committee proposals are treated by Penrose, supra note 11, at 151-53.
The recommendations, far from being dead, may still stand as a challenge to the City,
although Pennington concludes: "[I]t is now doubtful whether they will be adopted unless
a full-scale regulation of takeover bids by the Government is undertaken." Pennington,
supra note 140, at 163.
167 The Metal Industries defense was permissable because of one of the technical
faults in the Revised Notes. This was that the Stock Exchange rules required shareholder
approval only for a share issue made for cash. The Notes did not strongly state that
defending management was not to wrest the decision away from shareholders. Pennington,
supra note 140, at 170-71. Company law coincided with Exchange requirements: preemptive
rights do not exist and shareholder approval is not necessary to issue shares unless the
articles of association so provide. Instead, directors must act as fiduciaries when issuing
further share capital. This is an aspect of the consensual nature of company law. Gower,
supra note 113, at 1380. Thus, Metal Industries reduced Aberdare's holding from 53.5%
to 82% by issuing authorized but unissued shares to acquire a subsidiary of the preferred
suitor. Neither the Stock Exchange nor the other City institutions punished the parties.
Cf. Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 48 Del. Ch. 853, 280 A.2d 769 (Ch. 1967), where, on
almost identical facts, the court held that issuance of shares to a preferred suitor was for
an improper purpose and was also a breach of directors' common law fiduciary duty.
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the week following, no fewer than four major London Times articles
urged the City, as the seat of the British securities industry, to
strengthen self-regulation of takeovers.168 As a result of that public
outcry, the Council of the Stock Exchange, supported by the Governor
of the Bank of England, asked the Issuing Houses Association to recon-
vene the City working party, the ad hoc committee charged with
writing self-regulatory guidelines. 6 9
That fall, the working party turned their efforts towards a new
scheme 170 and produced the City Code on Take-Overs and Mergers
in March 1968. Although this was the third self-regulatory effort in
nine years, commentators were not skeptical; the financial columnists
paid homage to the new document. 1 ' Principal features of the Code
were that the rules were not merely guidelines, but mandatory rules,
and that an eight-man Take-Over Panel of prestigious City representa-
tives would enforce the now mandatory rules for takeover conduct.
The Governor of the Bank of England endorsed the new system. All
concerned expressed relief that legislative interference had been fore-
stalled.
The honeymoon was short. In the summer of 1968, the Panel
encountered and failed its first test-the American Tobacco takeover
of Gallaher Cigarettes. 172 Gallaher shares were being quoted at $2.50.
On June 26, Phillip Morris made a tender offer of three dollars which
Gallaher termed "quite unacceptable." Phillip Morris decided to with-
draw and wait to make another offer until after Gallaher published a
profit forecast in July. A few weeks later, but before Gallaher's profit fore-
cast, American Tobacco made a $4.20 offer to Gallaher shareholders.
The offer was oversubscribed in two hours. It was later revealed that
the broker acting as a repository for tenders, and the merchant
banker advising American Tobacco, had as clients the members of an
underwriting syndicate that had earlier floated a secondary offering of
thirty-six percent of the Gallaher shares outstanding. The offering
had flopped, leaving the syndicate with a twelve percent holding in
168 See The Times (London), July 17, 1967, at 1, col. 8; id. at 17, col. 1; id., July 18,
1967, at 17, col. 1; id., July 21, 1967, at 20, col. 5.
169 Id., July 20, 1967, at 17, col. 1.
170 The institutions represented on the working party were the Issuing Houses Asso.
ciation, the Association of Investment Trusts, the Accepting Houses Committee, the
Committee of London Clearing Bankers, the National Association of Pension Funds, the
Council of the Stock Exchange, and the Confederation of British Industry. Id., March 27,
1968, at 21, col. 3.
171 One line of praise was: "[C]learly better than the danger of a new and probably
cumbersome bureaucratic machine." Id. at 27, col. 1. See also id. at 21, col. I.
172 A detailed account of this takeover is set out in 78 FORTuNE, Oct. 1968, at 79.
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Gallaher. The broker and the merchant banker took up 100 percent
of the shares of their clients, the underwriting syndicate members,
before taking up pro rata the shares in public hands. The Panel
intervened, alleging violation of the Code provision that "[a]ll share-
holders of the same class of an offeree company shall be treated similarly
by an offeror company."'173 The Panel concluded that the broker and the
merchant banker had violated the Code. But the Stock Exchange in
admonishing the member broker announced that the broker had
breached the Code principle in good faith. The Issuing Houses Associ-
ation, dealing with the member merchant banker, said the Association
viewed the whole matter with "grave concern." Then the Governor of
the Bank of England wrote to the Panel:
Action in breach of the code is not justifiable in any circumstances.
It harms the reputation of those who are guilty of it, and is prej-
udicial to the good name of the City in general.... [If the City
can not discipline itself during future takeover battles] no doubt
some form of statutory control will be considered.174
Thus, the Gallaher Tobacco affair ended with no real penalties levied
for serious violations of the Code. Dissatisfaction with the Panel
grew.175
Gallaher Tobacco highlighted the last remaining fault in the self-
regulatory scheme. Although mandatory rules existed and a Panel had
been created to enforce them, the Code provided no definite penalties
for breach of the rules.176 The Panel in effect lapsed back into the
173 Crry CODE general principle 7.
174 78 FoRTUNE, Oct. 1968, at 79, 82. The Economist commented that the City had
accepted the "lame excuses" given by American Tobacco's merchant banker and broker
and then said:
The Government seems to have made up its mind not to interfere at this stage
with the City's policing of the take-over code although the pressure on the Presi-
dent of the Board of Trade to set up an equivalent of the American Securities
and Exchange Commission is now very strong.... Of course if the present rate of
breaches and alleged breaches of the present code continues, the pressure from
industry-and even sections of the City-would force [the Government's] hand.
228 ECONOMIST, July 1968, at 74.
175 The Times (London), Oct. 26, 1968, at 17, col. 1.
176 Unfortunately the Stock Exchange is . . . in a weak position [regarding
regulation of takeover bids]. Its only weapon is the suspension or withdrawal
of quotation of the securities of the company in question, and it has been slow
to use this weapon because it hits innocent investors in the same manner as
those guilty of offending against accepted business ethics.
Schmitthoff, supra note 120, at 12. The author continues:
The effectiveness of the self-regulatory part of the British issues regulation depends
on the sanctions which the authorities administering the self-regulation can
apply. In the case of admission of new issues to quotation, the sanction-refusal
of admission-is strong and the self-regulation by the Stock Exchange operates
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posture of earlier days by merely making findings of fact, and then
referring the matter of sanctions to the associations of which the
violators were members. Apparently the associations were too dose
to the violators to mete out stiff punishment. This failure of the Panel
to discipline violators or take a stand on sanctions caused some of the
criticism to be aimed at Panel members themselves rather than at the
basic scheme. Both in answer to that criticism and as a regular step
in the original plan, the City reissued the Code in revised form and
the Panel was reconstituted in April 1969.177
B. Organization, Procedure, and Sanctions
Before entering the last period of British takeover history, that
dating from the Panel's reconstitution to the present day, the structure
of the regulatory scheme should be described, since that structure has
not undergone organic change since the 1969 reconstitution. The Panel
has eleven members, including a Chairman and Deputy Chairman, ap-
pointed by the Governor of the Bank of England from among City
notables; a full-time staff headed by a full-time Director General sup-
ports the Panel.
The Director General, and the Panel upon request, are available
for opinions before or during a bid. Although circulars must be sub-
mitted for screening to the Quotations Department of the Stock Ex-
change,178 the Panel will screen a document if a novel question arises. For
consultation on serious questions the full Panel can convene in less than
twenty-four hours. A party can then, with their permission, quote Panel
approval for what may seem to be out of the ordinary. If the facts are
as stated by a party requesting a ruling, the Panel will, in subsequent
Panel action, be bound by any ruling given. Matters of procedure and
substance can be the subject of policy statements or practice notes from
the Panel.179 These statements and notes, along with interpretations
given on problems that recur frequently, will presumably be taken up
in periodic revisions of the Code.
most efficiently. In the case of take-over procedure, however, the sanction is weak,
and self-regulation has not worked well.
Id. at 14.
177 Crry PANEL oN TzAxE-OvEms AND MERGERs, supra note 12, at 12.
178 ADMISSION TO QUOTATION 27.
179 The City Code contains substantive rules and disclosure principles for tender
offer conduct. Procedure for the scheme and for the Panel's operation is not set forth
in the City Code. Most of the procedural observations set forth have been gleaned from
the CITY PANEL ON TAKE-OvERs AND MERGERS, REPORT ON THE YEAR ENDED 31ST MARCH
1969 (1969), or from the Panel's operation in the Leasco-Pergamon affair.
As of October 1970, five practice notes and one policy statement had been issued.
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Once a bid is under way, the Panel will, upon probable cause,
intervene in the course of the bid. It may also investigate Code viola-
tions after the consummation of an offer. Investigations take the form
of informal questioning of bid participants by Panel members. After
important investigations, written opinions issue, to be given publicity
if warranted by the severity of the violation or the need for clarifica-
don. A party can appeal to an Appeals Committee, now headed by
Lord Pearce, who presides along with three Panel members not privy
to the original proceeding. In the event of an appeal, the Panel with-
holds the written opinion until the Appeals Committee renders a
decision, the entire procedure for investigating possible Code viola-
tions does not contemplate judging the merits or demerits of an
offer.180 With questions of fairness eliminated, Panel consideration
of an offer involves investigation of compliance with affirmative dis-
closure requirements, substantive rules for bid conduct, and disclo-
sure, antifraud, fiduciary, and other general principles.' 8 '
Immediately after taking office, the reconstituted Panel addressed
itself to the problem of sanctions, as highlighted by the American
Tobacco-Gallaher fiasco. As a result, a policy statement was issued.18 2
According to that statement, after time for appeal has expired, proven
disregard for the Code will result in sanctions by either the Panel or
the various City organizations. Panel sanctions can include private
or public censure or a call for a Board of Trade inquiry. City organiza-
tions' sanctions are handled through the Stock Exchange Council, the
Issuing Houses Association, and most other recognized associations
that have amended or are now amending their rules so as to make final
the Panel or Appeals Committee findings; these organizations will
henceforth give effect to Panel recommendations. The Board of Trade
has also agreed to accept Panel recommendations regarding licensed
dealers. As a result of these present or contemplated changes, violation
of the City Code may well mean loss of one's ability to carry on a
securities business. 83
The Panel has similar recourse with regard to a recalcitrant com-
pany; it may have the Stock Exchange suspend quotation in the com-
180 Crry CODE 4 (Introduction).
181 Whether the Panel had the latter powers was a point of contention in Leasco-
Pergamon. Text accompanying notes 268-69 infra.
182 City Panel on Take-Overs and Mergers, Policy Statement (April 28, 1969).
188 Furthermore, the policy statement announced that the Board of Trade had been
considering complete relinquishment of Board of Trade power under the Licensed
Dealers Rules. The policy statement seemed to hint that should the Panel do a satisfactory
job of policing the takeover area and of punishing Code violators, the government might
entrust the Panel with complete takeover jurisdiction. Id. at 3.
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pany's shares, issue a strong reprimand, publicize the violation, or take
other action it deems necessary to prevent fraud or force adequate
disclosure. s4 The Stock Exchange now includes compliance with the
Code as a part of the quotation agreement between company and
exchange.8 5 Thus, violation by a corporate party to a takeover may
result in delisting, with ensuing loss of access to British capital mar-
kets.1s6
C. Conducting an Offer Under the City Code
The City Code has twelve general principles applicable to con-
duct throughout the course of a tender offer, and thirty-five rules ap-
plicable at various stages of the bid. The rules are arranged in a chrono-
logical order roughly parallel to their applicability in the progression
of a tender offer. The Code's application will be demonstrated by
applying it to a hypothetical offer. American treatment will also be
considered where appropriate.
1. Partial Bid or Complete Control
Oddly enough, one of the preliminary questions will plummet
the offeror, X, into the heart of the Code. X must at the outset decide
what percentage of the target company's stock it wishes to obtain. Al-
though the possibilities are numerous, including working control,
voting control, and complete control, the British City Code will sub-
ject X to several disadvantages if it seeks less than 100 percent of the
target company's voting stock; these increase, moreover, if less than
184 As has been noted at note 150 and accompanying text supra, one senses that
adverse publicity and public censure play a large part in the British financial com-
munity's self-regulation. One can surmise possible reasons for this phenomenon. The
securities industry is very centralized, allowing members of the City establishment to
readily subject a nonconformist to group pressure. Eleven years of operation under
constant threat of governmental regulation gives incentive for City members to use such
pressure in order to avoid adverse publicity for the industry. Another factor is the
detailed financial reporting in newspapers. Financial editors do not hold back on criticism
of City behavior or of the self-regulatory efforts. Thus, the financial community must take
special care to avoid suspicion of scandal.
185 See The Times (London), March 27, 1968, at 21, col. 2.
186 See text accompanying notes 119-20 supra.
Many details, of course, remain unclear. For instance, the British are not sure that
associations will follow all Panel recommendations. The threat of governmental interven-
tion, however, and the government's tentative stand behind the Panel, strengthened by
Leasco-Pergamon (text accompanying note 273 infra), provide incentive for the various
groups to follow Panel orders. Another apparent gap is whether and by whom sanctions
will be applied if the violator is neither in a securities business nor associated with a
takeover participant. The British believe that matters such as these will be taken care
of satisfactorily in future Panel statements.
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voting control is sought.187 The disadvantages are that the offeror
must allow tenders to be withdrawn during a longer period, is re-
quired to take up shares on a pro rata basis, and may be deprived of
market trading privileges. 8
An initial difficulty arises because of the Code's use of the term
"unconditional," which is less than clearly defined:
References to an offer becoming or being declared unconditional
include cases in which the offer has as a result of the receipt of
sufficient acceptances been announced to have become or been de-
clared unconditional subject only to one or more other previously
stated conditions including for example the creation of additional
capital [or] the grant of quotation..., being fulfilled. 89
The term is better understood in the context of rules 20, 21, and 26.
According to rule 21, an offer must initially be open for at least
twenty-one days. Although the depositing shareholder may not with-
draw his deposited shares during the first twenty-one days,190 he may
do so at the end of that period, unless the offer has been declared
unconditional. Whether the offer can be so declared is governed by
rules 20 and 26. Rule 20 permits an offer to be declared unconditional
if the offeror company has acquired or agreed to acquire more than
fifty percent of the target voting rights. Rule 26 denies this privilege
where the offer is for less than fifty percent and states instead that such
a bid may not be declared unconditional unless acceptances are re-
ceived for the number of shares desired; rule 26 also requires all
partial bidders to take up shares pro rata should the offer be over-
subscribed.191 The effect of these three provisions is that an offeror
who bids for control and who has acquired or agreed to acquire more
187 American tender offer regulation would impinge only slightly on the decision: if
an American corporation sought less than 100% of a class of target stock and if the offer
were oversubscribed, it would have to take up pro rata shares tendered in the offer's first
10 days-hardly a disadvantage. Text accompanying note 78 supra.
188 Crry CODE rules 20-21, 24, 26.
189 Id. at 5 (Definitions).
190 In the United States, the tendering shareholder may withdraw during the first
seven days. Text accompanying note 76 supra.
The British rules combine to offer added protection to minority shareholders by
discouraging offers that would create a minority susceptible to oppression. Such a minor-
ity is especially undesirable when opposite a monolithic majority; 65% to 85% in one set
of hands leaves little room for dissent and much room for oppression. The British scheme
is also permeated with examples of concern, care, and protection for minority share-
holders caught in the middle of a tender offer. See, e.g., Crry CoDE general principles 7-10;
Ed. rules 10, 20-21, 24, 26. The American legal system offers only the protection that
§ 14(e), rule lOb-5, state law concepts of fiduciary duty, and state blue sky laws might
offer the minority after it has been created.,
191 Since the partial bidder cannot withdraw the offer until the twenty-second day,
the pro rata period in the British scheme is 21 days versus the American 10.
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than fifty percent may keep his offer open after twenty days without
subjection to withdrawal of deposited shares. An offeror who bids for
less may, after twenty-one days, prevent withdrawal only if his an-
nounced goal has been met. As a practical matter, since all offers will
be open for twenty-one days, a shareholder need not deposit his shares
until the last day.
One more disadvantage, in addition to the pro rata requirement,
stems from making an offer for less than 100 percent. A British offeror
who bids for 100 percent may, unlike his American counterpart, trade
in offeree shares during the course of a bid.192 But the partial bidder
may not deal in the shares of the offeree company during the offer
period. Furthermore, the partial bidder for less than fifty percent can-
not purchase target company securities in the market for twelve months
after the offer expires without Panel permission. 193
2. Negotiated or Surprise Offer
After weighing the disadvantages of a partial bid, X must then
answer another preliminary question: whether to first approach target
company management in hopes of achieving a negotiated tender offer.
If X opts to negotiate first rather than make a surprise bid, several
Code rules come into play. An examination of these rules and of the
general principles reveals detailed guidelines as to the duties of both
offeror and offeree during negotiations that may lead to a tender
offer.194 For example, among the guidelines is a warning that the
offeror must endeavor to negotiate in secret so as to prevent an infor-
mation leak that might cause speculative trading.9 5 In the event of an
untoward movement in share prices, the negotiating parties must make
an immediate announcement about the true state of affairs. 196 Offerors
must also bear in mind that should negotiations bring forth offers
to a few large offeree shareholders, any subsequent offer must be on
terms at least as favorable as those the large shareholders have re-
ceived.1 7
The same or similar precepts apply to the target company in the
192 "[l]t is considered undesirable to fetter the market. Accordingly, all parties to a
take-over or merger transaction ... are free to deal at arm's length .... " Crry CoDE
rule 29. American authorities have through rule lb-13, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-13 (1970).
prohibited both cash and exchange offerors from market purchases of offeree shares. See
text accompanying notes 91-94 supra.
193 Crry CODE rule 29.
194 Id. rules 1-12. Note that some of the rules also bear on an offeror making a
surprise bid.
195 Id. rules 5, 7.
196 Id. rule 5.
197 E.g., id. general principle 8.
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negotiation stage. The Code reminds offeree directors to act in the
interests of the shareholders as a whole and specifically forbids some of
the more common ways in which directors can in a tender offer situ-
ation breach their fiduciary duties.198 The Code warns against favoring
a preferred suitor by giving that suitor more or different information
than that given to another potential offeror. 19 More positively, target
company directors have the right to demand proof that a potential
offeror is bona fide through requesting evidence that the offeror has
the means to implement the offer.2°0 When two companies are agreed
as to the basic terms and are reasonably confident that a bid will be
forthcoming, the Code directs them to make an immediate and pre-
ferably joint press announcement. 20 1
3. Stock or Cash Offer
Regardless of the offeror's decision on the other two preliminary
matters, he must also make one other important pre-bid decision:
whether to offer stock or cash. Once the decision for cash is made, the
primary task is to raise the money.20 2 Using securities as the medium
means that both the tender offer regulations and the exchange offer
requirements of the Stock Exchange Federation will apply.20 3
The requirements of the British Stock Exchange Federation fit
an exchange offer into one of two categories: an offer by a company
seeking quotation simultaneously with the making of the offer, and an
offer of an issue already quoted.20 4 As to the first category, the amount
of the offering must be C 100,000 and the total valuation placed on the
company C 250,000. At least fourteen days before the offering, page
198 For example, they cannot ordinarily transfer control unless a similar offer is made
to all other shareholders (id. rule 10) and they must be prepared to justify to the Panel
their recommendation of the lower of two offers (id. rule 9).
199 Id. rule 11.
200 Id. rule 3.
201 Id. rule 5.
The guidelines provided by the New York Stock Exchange are somewhat analogous
to the City Code rules affecting negotiations. These guidelines tell companies to make
timely disclosure to ward off speculative market activity, to keep secret corporate
developments like tender offers, and to give information on an equal basis to all who
inquire. NEw Yosu STocK EXcHANGE, supra note 78, at A-18 to -19.
202 American regulations governing this stage include the Federal Reserve Board's
Regulations G, T, U, 12 C.F.R. §§ 207.1-07.5, 220.4-20.6, 221.1-21.4 (1970). These regulations
limit the amount of money that can be lent to a percentage of the market value of the
securities to be purchased if such securities will be collateral for the loan. Further, the
offeror must disclose its borrowing to the SEC.
203 Stock exchange requirements displace the company law provisions in most cases.
See text accompanying notes 127-28 supra.
204 See ADMISI.ON TO QUOTATION 2.
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proofs of the draft prospectus must be filed with the Stock Exchange.
This prospectus, and other documents such as the memorandum and
articles of association, are screened by the exchange. A member broker
or issuing house, employed to sponsor quotation of the issue, must state
that it is satisfied with the accuracy of the prospectus. A hearing is held
on the application. When the offer takes place, the prospectus is
published in two leading newspapers. Preliminary announcements,
confined to excerpts of the prospectus, can be inserted in the press if
submitted to the exchange at least four days in advance. 205
The Federated Exchanges impose less stringent requirements on
acquirers offering an issue already quoted.208 Moreover, in both cases,
certain additional information must be included in the takeover circu-
lar. The additional information includes the latest price of the security
offered together with six other prices from the previous six months,
description of the offeror's profit and dividend figures for the last
three years, changes in financial condition since the last available
accounts, the date of the next dividend in which accepting target share-
holders will participate, and designation of the place where the
accounts, memorandum and articles of association, and material con-
tracts will be available for inspection.207
4. Preparing the Offer
Finally, after resolving all the preliminary questions, X begins to
prepare the actual offer. This stage will not vary significantly whether
the medium is securities or cash. If a non-negotiated offer has been
decided on, X will begin by obtaining the target's shareholder list,
usually by means of a third party so as to avoid tipping off the tar-
get.208 Armed with names of shareholders, X will find communication
by circular the most practicable means of reaching target share-
holders.209 The best starting point for constructing the bid circular is
the list of required particulars of disclosure directed by the Federated
205 Id. at 49-53, 64-71.
206 Id. at 53-57, 71-78.
207 Id. at 23-25. An American offeror forgoes secrecy and surprise in making an
exchange offer because of the requirements of the registration process. British offerors
need not sacrifice secrecy in choosing the stock route.
208 Companies Act § 113 forces a company to give a shareholder list to anyone who
asks for it.
209 American practice differs. One can obtain a shareholder list only upon establishing
grounds entitling one to the list. E.g., Ilu. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.45 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1970) (proper purpose). As one commentator noted: "The result is that if you file a
petition alleging proper purpose or, in fact, showing proper purpose, and that is contro-
verted, you have a trial of an issue of fact with the resulting delays." Stephan, Highlights
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Exchanges. 210 Quite simply, the particulars of disclosure include: (1)
the heading "if you are in any doubt about this offer, you should con-
sult your Stockbroker, Bank Manager, Solicitor, or other professional
adviser"; (2) the date, name, and address of the offeror; (3) the name
and address of the person making the offer if other than the offeror;
(4) when and where to tender; (5) whether the stock will become ex
dividend during the offer; (6) when and how the cash will be paid;
(7) conditions, including the number of acceptances; (8) if a partial
offer, the reasons why; (9) whether, when once acquired, the securities
will be transferred to any other person; (10) particulars on any agree-
ments between offeror and offeree directors; (11) the latest middle
market quotation for offeree shares together with at least six quota-
tions from the previous six months; (12) the intentions of the offeror
regarding the offeree company; and (13) any change in the offeree
company's financial position known to the offeror and not included
in the offeree company's latest balance sheet.21'
Code rules and principles lean heavily on the British offeror in
preparing its circular. The general disclosure standard is the most in-
clusive of these rules:
Shareholders shall have in their possession sufficient evidence, facts
and opinions upon which an adequate judgement and decision can
be reached, and shall have sufficient time to make an assessment
and decision. No relevant information shall be withheld from
them.212
With that standard in mind, X should also recall that the Code re-
quires a statement in the circular that its Board of Directors "have
considered all statements of fact and opinion contained therein and
accept, individually and collectively, responsibility therefor and
of the Montgomery Ward Proxy Contest from a Lawyer's Viewpoint, 11 Bus. LAw. 86,
90 (1955). Consequently, the American offeror may by-pass the attempt to get a share-
holder list and use advertisements in the financial media instead of circulars to imple-
ment the surprise offer.
210 These are the same requirements imposed on dealers by the Licensed Dealers
Rules. Thus, although the Rules apply to only five percent of Britain's investment firms,
their influence is strong in areas of self-regulation. Text accompanying notes 147-51 supra.
211 ADMissION TO QUOTATION 23-25. While X is preparing its circular, X's American
counterpart is turning to Securities Exchange Act § 14 to prepare its filing for the SEC.
Although the required disclosures may be troublesome, they are not so extensive as the
British requirements. Of course, the American exchange offeror is following a different
path at this point-preparing a registration statement for an offer weeks away.
212 Crry CODE general principle 3. An American offeror must consider whether his
advertisement contains an "untrue statement of a material fact ... necessary in order to
make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading.... SEC rule lOb-5(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (1970). The less than affirmative
language of this disclosure standard will often mean that an offeror does not give target
shareholders the information needed to make an informed decision.
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consider that no material factors or considerations have been omit-
ted."213 Pursuant to these general precepts, X must include in the
circular its holdings and its directors' holdings in the offeree company,
together with dates and prices for purchases in the previous six
months. 214 X must procure from an appropriately independent party
a statement that it has the means to carry out the offer and include
such statement in the circular.215 To assure that great care is taken in
preparing any profit forecasts or asset revaluations for the circular, and
to assure that all assumptions upon which such forecasts are based are
stated, X must procure another opinion from an independent source
on the reasonableness of the forecasts or revaluations. 216
5. Launching the Offer
Having prepared the takeover circular, X is ready to launch its
offer. After the takeover circular is screened by the Quotations Depart-
213 Crry COD rule 13. American law does not require such a due diligence statement.
214 Id. rule 16. Similar American requirements exist. Text accompanying note 56
supra.
215 Crry CoDE rule 17. One purpose behind the American disclosure requirement
concerning offeror borrowing is to enable shareholders to evaluate the offeror's ability to
complete the acquisition. Text accompanying notes 59-60 supra. A further protective step
would be a City Code-like certification by a third party that the offeror will be able to
pay for shares tendered. Such certification, though, does not by itself help the share-
holder determine whether the acquirer has been borrowing heavily and thus may be a
corporate raider.
216 CITy CoDE rule 15. The WHEAT REPORT 95-96 describes the American view:
A number of experienced security analysts suggested to the Study that the
Commission should permit "controlled" projections of sales and earnings in
prospectuses and other documents fied with the Commission. ... The British
disclosure system recognizes this to a limited degree and the Study carefully
considered the merits of British practice. Moreover, the Study recognizes that
most investment decisions are based essentially on estimates of future earnings.
Lawyers, underwriters and company officials were generally opposed to the
analysts' suggestion. Even if projections were not required but only permitted, it
was observed that problems of civil liability would be insurmountable unless
projections in prospectuses were expressly granted immunity from sections 11 and
12 of the [1938] Act. This would be extremely difficult for the Commission to do.
Moreover, from a management standpoint, projections may change rapidly during
a given year as changes occur in the factors on which they are based. Inclusion
of such changing projections in a prospectus, which might be used long after it
became effective would give rise to significant problems.
It has been the Commission's long-standing policy not to permit projections
and predictions in prospectuses and reports filed with the Commission. Such
documents are designed to elicit material facts. Their factual character is widely
recognized. Investors and their advisers are at liberty to make their own projec-
tions based on disclosures resulting from the Commission's requirements. A real
danger exists, in the Study's judgment, that projections appearing in prospectuses
and other documents filed under the securities laws and reviewed by the Com-
mission would be accorded a greater measure of validity by the unsophisticated
than they would deserve.
For these reasons the Study concludes that the Commission's policy on
projections should not be changed.
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ment of the Stock Exchange,217 X will file a copy with the Take-Over
Panel.218 The Code then requires that X put the offer forward to the
board of the offeree company.219 The offeree board must notify share-
holders by press announcement as soon as the offer is received.
220
When that occurs, offeror X sends out the circular and the offer begins.
Characteristically, the pace, if not slowed by regulation, speeds up
considerably once the offer begins. Probably the first step will be a
decision on the offer by the offeree board. In accordance with its
fiduciary duty to act in the interests of the company as a whole, the
board decides either to recommend acceptance of the offer, to remain
silent and do nothing, to remain silent but assert defenses against the
offer, or to resist the offer verbally and legally.
6. Offeree Response
Once the offeree board recommends acceptance, little more re-
mains than to await the outcome. Of course, in communicating its
recommendation, an American offeree board must meet certain basic
standards of disclosure and file its communications with the SEC.
221
An American offeree board, though, can and perhaps will remain
silent.222 The board's silence cuts against the success of an American
offer; since the offeror finds it impracticable to obtain a shareholder
list and usually relies on advertisements, a target shareholder who does
not see the advertisements and hears nothing from his company may
never know about the offer.223 If the offeree board does speak against
the offer, it must not make untrue or misleading statements or omit
217 ADMISSION TO QUOTATION 23-25.
218 All parties to a takeover must file all releases or circulars with the Panel. Crr
CODE rule 19.
219 Id. rule 1.
220 Id. rule 5. At the time the American offeror files with the SEC, it sends a
duplicate filing to the target company and its news advertisements begin to run. The
American offer is, in one step, in full swing.
221 Text accompanying notes 73-74 supra.
222 "Rather surprisingly, there is no requirement that management . .. express its
views on the desirability of the tender offer." Hamilton, supra note 4, at 284-85. Krasik,
supra note 4, at 459, hints that general disclosure standards do not in themselves require
such offeree disclosure: "[T]here seems to be no question that a defendant can violate
lob-5 through complete silence .... [B]ut as of now, a refusal to make a recommendation
to shareholders would not be a violation of lOb-5."
223 See Krasik, supra note 4, at 462. But see Haack, supra note 112, at 933:
The [New York Stock] Exchange is of the view that when a company does become
the target of a tender offer, management is obliged to notify its stockholders that
the offer is being made. Management may certainly document its vigorous opposi-
tion to an offer, or its enthusiastic support, and has no obligation to assist the
offeror in any way. But management ... does have an obligation to acquaint all
stockholders with the fact that an offer is being made.
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material facts. But whether a resisting American board chooses to
speak or remain silent, it can exert any number of other defense
tactics.
Many American corporations have devised strategies for defending
should an offer ever be made for their company. 224 The defenses
utilize a host of different tactics, some of which may be illegal under
American law. Management may drive up the price of the stock;2 25
sue for an injunction against the offeror, alleging that misleading state-
ments or omissions in the offer violate rule lOb-5 and section 14(e);2 26
arrange a defensive merger with a more acceptable partner and thereby,
among other things, dilute the equity available for purchase by the
offeror;2 27 do the same by issuing additional shares to friendly persons
for various reasons; 2 8 seek to obtain governmental intervention under
the antitrust laws, if need be by acquiring a business in the same line
as the offeror;2 29 call on state securities commissioners to block the
offer as being unfair;2 30 call attention to the tax consequences of the
offer;2 31 and exert other defenses, some only variations on these basic
themes. But however large the possible array of defenses, some of these
tactics may not be available under the corporate laws of certain states,
the rules of some exchanges, or under federal or state securities laws.23 2
224 See Cohen, supra note 1, at 28-29, 100-02, for a suggested prearranged strategy.
See also Bradshaw, Defensive Tactics Employed by Incumbent Managements in Contesting
Tender Offers, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1104 (1969); Hayes & Taussig, Tactics of Cash Takeover
Bids, 45 HARv. Bus. REv. 135 (1967); Kennedy, Defensive Take-Over Procedures Since the
Williams Act, 19 CATHOLIC U.L. R v. 158 (1969); Mullaney, Guarding Against Takeovers-
Defensive Charter Provisions, 25 Bus. LAW. 1441 (1970); Schmults & Kelly, Cash Take-Over
Bids-Defense Tactics, 23 Bus. LAw. 115 (1967).
225 E.g., by defensive warehousing as in Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co.,
419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970).
220 E.g., Susquehanna Corp. v. Pan Am. Sulphur Co., 423 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1970);
Armour & Co. v. General Host Corp., 296 F. Supp. 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
227 Or management may merely publicize the possibility of a merger with a more
attractive party as in Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970).
228 In Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp., 426 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1970),
target Piper issued 469,199 shares to acquire two small corporations by merger and
sought through the resultant dilution to reduce Chris-Craft's chance for successful take-
over of Piper. The New York Stock Exchange promptly suspended trading in Piper shares
and began proceedings before the SEC for delisting, alleging violation of the requirement
that shareholder approval be obtained for the issuance of large share blocks. Piper, under
those threats, rescinded the transactions.
229 Armour & Co. v. General Host Corp., 296 F. Supp. 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
230 Note 109 and accompanying text supra.
231 If most target stock is held at a low tax basis, a cash offer may become unattrac-
tive when target company management emphasizes that the excess of cash received over
basis is taxable. See Cohen, supra note 1, at 28.
232 Id. See also Haack, supra note 112, at 934:
1971]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
American offerees, even though limited in the defenses they can use,
do wage long and fierce battles, and often succeed in defeating a tender
offer.23
3
The offeree's posture under the British regulatory scheme is at
almost every step different from an American target's position. The
offeree board must begin by stating its views on the offer almost im-
mediately after the offer is received.234 Any such communication re-
garding the offer is governed by the same general disclosure standard and
the same rules as to profit forecasts, and must contain the same due
diligence representation as the offeror's circular.235 In addition, the
City Code requires the offeree board to detail holdings of offeree direc-
tors in both the offeror and offeree companies, and of the offeree com-
pany itself in the offeror, together with dates and prices for purchases
in the last six months. Then each director must state in the offeree
document his intention regarding his individual holding in the com-
pany.236
Perhaps more important is the City Code's flat prohibition of
offeree defenses. The target company cannot take any action "which
could effectively result in any bona fide offer being frustrated or in
the shareholders of the offeree company being denied an opportunity
to decide on its merits. " 237 Thus, if the target of a tender offer in Great
Britain chooses to resist the offer, it must rely upon management's past
record and upon the company's future prospects, which prospects may
be shown in the form of earnings and sales predictions and assets re-
valuations.
7. Substantive Limits on the Bid
As noted, the British have substantive rules that discourage partial
bids.238 There are also other substantive rules that govern conduct of a
In its role as watchdog of corporate democracy, the Exchange last year was
disturbed by a number of so-called "defensive tactics" developing in response to
the growing number of takeover bids. Some of the techniques seemed clearly to
violate the principle of corporate democracy.
233 E.g., B. F. Goodrich fought for months and finally defeated Northwest Industries's
takeover attempt. Northwest Indus., Inc., 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 70,816 (Ohio Dep't of
Commerce 1969).
234 CrrY CODE rule 12.
235 Id. rules 13-15.
236 Id. rule 16.
237 Id. general principle 4. The United States may be moving slowly in that direction.
The recent amendment of § 14(e) (note 84 supra) is in part directed at offeree defenses:
"The committee by adopting this section intends to allow the Commission to deal more
adequately with the sophisticated devices sometimes employed by both sides in contested
tender offers." S. REP. No. 1125, supra note 24, at 6.
238 Text accompanying notes 187-93 supra.
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bid. The offer must be open twenty-one days, and if the offeror seeking
voting control obtains or agrees to obtain fifty percent of the target's
voting shares, it can, prior to the twenty-first day, bind shareholders
who have tendered.239 Once the offeror declares the offer unconditional
-binding tenderers-the offer must remain open for acceptances for
another fourteen days.240 Further, an offer must be kept open for eight
days more after a revision in the offer. If the change is an increase in
the consideration offered, X must pay the increased consideration to
those who tendered before as well as to those who tendered after the
increase. In no case, though, can the offeror tie up tendered shares
for more than sixty days after the initial offer.241
British and American regulations both, then, have an increase-in-
consideration rule. Both have pro rata periods, the British twenty-one
days and the American ten days.242 The only respect in which the
American substantive limitations are more liberal is in the flat seven-
day withdrawal period. In Britain, if the bid is for voting control, the
shareholder who has tendered loses his right to withdraw after twenty-
one days if the offeror accepts or agrees to accept more than fifty-per-
cent of the offeree voting stock and declares the offer unconditional.
Yet since the British target shareholder always has twenty-one days to
make the original decision on tendering, the right to withdraw becomes
of lesser urgency. Shareholders who have not been rushed by time
limitations in their initial decisions will be less likely to withdraw. The
overall effect of the British bid conduct rules is a considerable slowing
of the tender offer process.
8. Share Dealings
Another aspect of regulation during the actual course of the
tender offer concerns trading in either company's shares by the com-
panies themselves or by their associates.243 Extending back before
the offer has been announced, the British system forbids insiders from
trading on the information that an offer may be forthcoming.244 A
British offeror, not being subject to any reporting requirements under
either company law or the City Code, can warehouse offeree company
239 Crry CODE rules 20-21.
240 Id. rule 22.
241 Id. rule 21; id. general principle 8.
242 Note 191 supra.
243 This is governed in Britain by Crry CoDE rules 29-33.
244 Id. rule 30. This is of course the sum and substance of the American rule
announced in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
US. 976 (1969).
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stock.245 Although no reporting requirements exist and an offeror can
maintain secrecy while warehousing, if a British offeror makes an offer
to one or more target shareholders before the general bid, the Code
explicitly demands that the bid must be on similarly favorable terms.246
And if these one or two shareholders have large holdings approaching
or involving control, the offeror must extend a bid to all other share-
holders after purchasing those controlling interests. 247
Once the bid begins, the British partial bidder cannot purchase
target shares in the market. The British offeror aiming at 100 percent
of the target shares can make market purchases during the bid, subject
to daily reporting to the stock exchange, the press, and the Take-Over
Panel. 248 When, however, market purchases by the British offeror are
above the offer price, the offeror must pay the weighted average price
of such purchases to all those who sell to it pursuant to the bid.24 9
Defensive purchasing-the target company bidding for its own
shareholders' stock-is allowed in Britain, subject only to reporting
to the stock exchange, the press, and the Take-Over Panel.250 Of course,
the Code provisions forbidding the offeree to take action frustrating
an offer or to take action depriving shareholders of the ultimate deci-
sion may impinge heavily upon the offeree's power to buy in the mar-
ket during the pendency of an offer.
D. The Leasco-Pergamon Affair
The ten-year period, 1959-69, saw considerable refinement of the
British self-regulatory experience, culminating in the Take-Over
Panel's strong policy statement on sanctions. Last in this process of
evolution is the Leasco-Pergamon affair, which serves as an example
of the scheme's operation and as an indication of its acceptance by the
government and the public. Leasco-Pergamon was the first British take-
over in which the system operated satisfactorily-the first major in-
cident after the regulatory system had come of age.
245 An American offeror can also warehouse, but upon reaching the five percent level
it will have to report its dealings in offeree shares. Text accompanying note 50 supra.
246 CrrY CODE general principle 9.
247 Id. rule 10.
248 Id. rule 29. An American offeror, of course, can never purchase target company
shares in the market once the bid has been launched. Text accompanying notes 91-94
.supra.
249 Crry CODE rule 31. Cf. rule lOb-13 as originally proposed, text accompanying notes
91-92 supra.
250 CITY CODE rule 29. Before purchasing its own shares an American target company
must disclose to the SEC and to its shareholders its intentions and methods in making
such purchases. Text accompanying notes 82-83 supra.
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In early 1969, Leasco Data Processing began to search for a dynamic
leader for European computer operations. Robert Maxwell, Pergamon
Press board chairman and leading stockholder, attracted Leasco's eye.251
Besides, Pergamon as a publisher of scientific books and journals had a
vast storehouse of publications that would be a valuable adjunct to
a computer service. On June 17, 1969, Leasco and Pergamon jointly
announced an offer to Pergamon shareholders at thirty-seven shillings
per share, with details to be worked out and the formal offer to be
made sometime in July.252 Then Leasco's representatives began looking
at Pergamon's books with a view towards preparing a pro forma fore-
cast for Leasco's European operations. Meanwhile, Leasco began ware-
housing Pergamon shares, buying at thirty-five to thirty-six and reaching
over the twenty-one percent level on July 9.253 British authorities
granted various consents to the takeover.2 54 On July 24 Leasco dis-
closed a purchase bringing its Pergamon holdings to thirty-five per-
cent.
2 55
251 The Leasco-Pergamon episode featured a confrontation between two personalities,
Saul Steinberg of Leasco Data Processing and Robert Maxwell of Pergamon Press. Steinberg
had founded Leasco in 1961 with $25,000 capital. In 1968 Leasco had assets of $775
million; its earnings had rocketed from $1.4 million in 1967 to $27 million in 1968. Among
Steinberg's coups was the takeover of Reliance Insurance. Steinberg was one of the first
to realize that insurance companies had valuable reserves, useful in an acquisition pro-
gram. Perhaps, however, Steinberg achieved his greatest acclaim in failure. He had
announced a probable exchange offer for Chemical Bank of New York. Bank trust depart-
ments began selling Leasco shares heavily and Leasco's financial advisers refused to work
in the bid. Steinberg eventually was forced by the financial community to abandon the
idea. But at the age of 30, he began eyeing one of the United Kingdom's largest corpora-
lions. At that point one commentator wrote of Steinberg:
There is an obvious and intriguing parallel with his current adversary, Robert
Maxwell. Both slogged their own way to the top, making the inevitable enemies
in the process. Both have been involved in takeover situations that drew fierce and
lasting competition from the powerful, conservative money establishment.
Jacobson, Saul Steinberg: Portrait of the Millionaire as a Young Man, The Times (Lon-
don), Oct. 7, 1969, at 23, col. 3.
Maxwell's achievements were not overshadowed by Steinberg's. He purchased Pergamon
Press in 1951 for £ 13,000. Through acquisitions and through development of the scientific
publishing business, Maxwell parlayed Pergamon into a corporation that recorded £ 2.1
million of earnings in 1968. Maxwell, too, was noted for failures-his 1967 L5.4 million
bid for Butterworths, the leading English legal publisher, and his 1968 bid for News of
the World, publisher of a leading newspaper supplement. In both cases the target
companies encouraged rival bids in order to defeat the Maxwell bid. Id., July 19, 1969,
at 25, col. 1; id., Aug. 23, 1969, at 11, col. 3.
252 Financial Times (London), June 19, 1969, at 21, col. 3.
253 The Times (London), July 10, 1969, at 28, col. 1.
254 Id., July 11, 1969, at 28, col. 3 (exchange control consent); id., July 19, 1969, at
12, col. 4 (antitrust approval).
255 Id., July 24, 1969, at 21, col. 6. At that time, with Maxwell's promised 34%,
Leasco had more than numerical control.
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During July, however, Leasco accountants had found that
Pergamon's statements as to past earnings and forecasts as to future
earnings were erroneous and misleading. Questionable transactions
were uncovered between Pergamon, International Learning Systems
Corporation (ILSC), a subsidiary in which Pergamon had a fifty per-
cent interest, and Maxwell Scientific, an American firm owned by
Robert Maxwell. 25 More importantly, there was the ugly specter of
Maxwell's self-dealing in Pergamon assets with a corporation he owned.
Since gaining Maxwell's services was one of Leasco's primary reasons
for making the Pergamon acquisition, any reflection on Maxwell's
integrity lessened the value of Pergamon in Leasco's eyes. Further
deterioration in Leasco-Pergamon relations resulted from Maxwell's
restating Pergamon's profit forecast at £ 2.05 million, compared with
the £2.5 million forecast in the original Leasco-Pergamon negotia-
tions.-2 57
The London financial press knew something was up when August
arrived and a formal offer had still not appeared. Inquiries were
answered in terms of a week or "in about a fortnight," with the addi-
tional comment that "there are many complications." 258 Then Leasco
discovered that a Maxwell family trust had sold 600,000 Pergamon shares
to a broker, who had in turn sold 200,000 to Rothschilds, Leasco's mer-
chant banker. Maxwell had not disclosed the sale.259 Maxwell was
to have sold his and his family's holdings in a single transaction after
the formal offer. By seemingly breaching that promise to Leasco, Max-
well further reduced Leasco's faith in him.2 60
On the day following discovery of the Maxwell sale, Friday,
August 22, Leasco withdrew. Pergamon share prices plummeted. The
Take-Over Panel asked each party to make an early public statement,
256 Pergamon, through ILSC, had been sending past issues of scientific journals to
Maxwell Scientific. The journals had been sent on something akin to a sale-or-return
basis, but Pergamon recorded the item as £ 660,000 sale. Because the transaction was a
sale or return of items of unknown market value, Pergamon's earnings would have to be
drastically revised depending upon whether the journals were sold and whether, if sold,
they would bring the price that Pergamon had recorded as the sale price. Id., Aug. 26,
1969, at 15, col. 1.
257 Id., Aug. 23, 1969, at 11, col. 7.
258 Id., Aug. 14, 1969, at 20, col. 4.
259 Id., Aug. 21, 1969, at 15, col. 1. Crr' ConE rule 29 would generally require
reporting of such a sale. However, the Panel accepted Maxwell's contention that he had no
control over the foreign trustees.
260 It also appeared that Maxwell had been attempting to salvage some gain when
he began to realize that the ultimate offer might not be forthcoming due to the sale-or-
return problem and other accounting matters. See Crry Cona rule 30, forbidding trading
on inside information.
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requested suspension of Pergamon quotations, and began meetings with
the parties.261 Formal statements by Leasco and Pergamon followed,2 2
consisting largely of character assassinations aimed at the opposing
side. The following week the Panel held extensive hearings.
The Panel found no serious breaches of the specific Code rules,
and did not cite any rule or principle of the City Code. Instead, the
Panel dealt with the problem of general disclosure, including omission
of Maxwell's relationship to Maxwell Scientific in past sales of journals
and misstatements of Pergamon's earnings. Since Pergamon's quotation
on the Stock Exchange had been suspended, no market existed for the
thirty-one percent of Pergamon's shares still in public hands. To aid
shareholders so locked in with Pergamon shares, the Panel brought
Leasco and Pergamon back together for negotiations. 2 3 In the end the
Panel approved a Leasco-Pergamon agreement whereby Leasco agreed
to take up outsiders' shares at twenty-five times the price-earnings ratio
and to take up insiders' holdings, namely Maxwell's, at nineteen times
earnings, with the figures to be based upon an independent audit of
1968 and 1969 Pergamon earnings. By asking the Board of Trade to
investigate, the Panel resolved the disclosure questions, the misleading
statements concerning Pergamon's earnings, and the nondisclosure of
substantial transactions between Pergamon and a company owned by
Pergamon's chief executive.2 6'
Although some commentators were skeptical before the Panel's
opinion issued,265 the financial media lauded the Panel's efforts as self-
regulatory success at last. Panel efforts in getting Leasco to reinstate
its offer had saved Pergamon shareholders from the catastrophe of
having to sell in the market once quotation of Pergamon was resumed.
More importantly, the Panel had been brave enough to venture into
the general disclosure area, and had also taken commendable action in
calling for a suspension of trading in Pergamon shares and for a Board
of Trade inquiry, an improvement over the mere slap on the wrist it
261 The Times (London), Aug. 22, 1969, at 15, col. 1.
262 Id., Aug. 23, 1969, at 11, col. 7; id., Aug. 27, 1969, at 17, col. 1.
263 Id., Aug. 26, 1969, at 15, col. 1; id., Aug. 28, 1969, at 1, col. 2.
264 The Panel withheld its opinion pending the outcome of the Leasco-Pergamon bid
reinstatement negotiations. On August 29, only one week after Leasco had withdrawn, the
Panel published its opinion. Id., Aug. 29, 1969, at 17, col. 2. After a review of facts, the
opinion found that Leasco had justly withdrawn on the basis of loss of faith in Maxwell
and Pergamon. The opinion then merely articulated the questions as to Maxwell and
Pergamon's disclosure. The disposition was the call for a Board of Trade inquiry to see
whether Maxwell had had a reasonable basis for the Pergamon profit forecasts and
whether Maxwell had disclosed to shareholders adequate information regarding the ISLC
accounts and the relationship between his companies and Pergamon. Id. at 21, col. 6.
265 E.g., id., Aug. 25, 1969, at 18, col. 4.
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administered in the American Tobacco-Gallaher takeover. The City
was pleased because legislative interference had been forestalled.216
The sequel was disappointing, although the events do not detract
from the Panel's accomplishment. The irascible Maxwell repudiated
the new agreement after a dispute on whether the agreement gave
Leasco the right to force Maxwell out as Pergamon's chief executive.
Leasco, however, expressed a continued desire to purchase public
shares. 267 Maxwell then appealed to the Take-Over Panel Appeals
Committee. He desired review of the Panel's call for a Board of Trade
inquiry. The most colorable contention was that the Panel had strayed
from its proper field-examination of bid documents and policing
of conduct during an actual takeover bid-into the general disclosure
area and into events having their genesis in actions occurring long
before the formal bid, such as the sale-or-return arrangement with
Maxwell Scientific. As Lord Pearce's Appeals Committee pointed out,
the Code requires that no relevant information be withheld from share-
holders.26 8 The Panel cannot secure fair treatment for shareholders,
said the Committee, if confined to examination of offer documents
and formal offeree replies. Likewise, pre-bid information cannot be
divorced from bid information if shareholders are to receive informa-
tion sufficient for an informed judgment on the offer.269
The Board of Trade inquiry into Pergamon's and Maxwell's
disclosure got underway soon after the Appeals Committee decision.
Beset by delays, including the reluctance of some ex-Pergamon direc-
tors to cooperate, the Board of Trade report was still not complete
more than a year and a half after the initial Panel action.270
On November 3, 1969, Leasco filed suit in the United States
against Maxwell, Maxwell Scientific, and others,271 alleging violation
266 Bus. Guardian, Aug. 29, 1969, at 10, col. 2; The Times (London), Aug. 29, 1969,
at 21, col. 1; id., Aug. 50, 1969, at 11, col. 3.
267 Financial Times (London), Sept. 15, 1969, at 1, col. 3.
268 Crry CoDE general principle 3.
269 The Times (London), Sept. 19, 1969, at 22, col. 5.
In a Pergamon shareholders meeting, held in October, Leasco overrode Maxwell's
last ditch effort to retain control of the Pergamon board. Leasco elected three independent
directors, eschewing complete control until it had made good on a renewed promise to
acquire numerical stock control through an offer to remaining Pergamon shareholders. The
Times (London), Oct. 6, 1969, at 18, col. 6; id., Oct. 10, 1969, at 19, col. 1; Wall St. J.,
Oct. 13, 1969, at 10, col. 2.
270 The Times (London), Sept. 10, 1969, at 1, col. 1; id., at 19, col. 2; id., Jan. 20, 1970,
at 17, col. 1.
271 Wall St. J., Nov. 4, 1969, at 9, col. 1. The allegations of Leasco are set forth in an
opinion on a jurisdictional issue. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, FED.
SEc. L. RP. 92,805 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 1970).
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of rule lOb-5 in inducing plaintiff Leasco into purchasing Pergamon
shares. The complaint alleged that Leasco was damaged because,
had the true facts been known, it could have purchased the Pergamon
shares at a lower price. It alleged further damages from the suspension
of quotation and the Board of Trade inquiry when the facts did come
to light.272 Thus, the year 1969 and the most recent period of British
takeover regulation ended in the United States with the Leasco suit.
On the other side of the Atlantic the year ended on a note strongly
favoring self-regulation:
At the Mansion House the Prime Minister allowed himself an
expression of satisfaction at the City's latest attempts at self-
policing, which began with the reconstitution of the Panel on
Takeovers and Mergers in the spring of this year. It is, of course,
too early to judge the work and effectiveness of the panel even if
its fiercest critics admit to admiring the speed and authority with
which it has worked2 73
V
DRAWING FRoM THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE
American securities regulation is based on the principle of dis-
closure. Besides deterring or detecting fraud and manipulation, dis-
closure is supposed to provide investors with enough information to
enable them to make rational investment decisions. Recognizing that
94a pragmatic balance must be struck between the needs of the unso-
phisticated investor and those of the knowledgeable student of fi-
nance,"274 the system of disclosure operates through a filtration process:
272 Pergamon's accounting methods, resulting in earnings overstatements and conse-
quent good market performance, made Pergamon appear to be a better target than it
was. Pergamon's course of conduct would seem to be a deceptive practice under Butler
Aviation Int'l, Inc. v. Comprehensive Designers, Inc., 807 F. Supp. 910 (S.D.N.Y. 1969),
aff'd, 425 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1970). In Butler, the offeree alleged that the potential acquirer's
past earnings misstatements made it seem a better offeror than was the case. Butler's
contention was that offeror Comprehensive, through earnings statements based upon
nondisclosure of accounting methods changes, had in the months preceding the exchange
offer pushed Comprehensive share prices from 15 to 35, thereby engaging in a deceptive
practice under rule lOb-5. The Second Circuit upheld trial court acceptance of the con-
tention.
273 The Times (London), Nov. 21, 1969, at 27, col. 1. For Maxwell, later events
sounded sour notes. After a year of untangling Pergamon accounts, independent auditors
published a revision of Pergamon earnings from the reported 1968 figure of £2.1 million
to £ 140,000. For the first nine months of 1969, earnings were less than £ 50,000. Maxwell
had in August 1969 forecast Pergamon 1969 profits at £ 2.05 million. Id., Aug. 20, 1970,
at 17, col. 1.
274 WHEAT REPORT 10.
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"Information communicated to and absorbed by professionals filters
out to and benefits a wider public. '275
It is clear that this leisurely process of disclosure cannot operate
effectively within the context of a fast-moving takeover situation. In
fact, the speed with which an American tender offer proceeds often
works to deprive the shareholder of an opportunity to make a meaning-
ful decision regarding the offer. Regulation of tender offers should
be improved with an eye towards restoring the shareholder to his
rightful position as arbiter of the offer. Besides aiding investors, regula-
tion in the tender offer area must, as it currently does not, provide
certainty for those whom the system regulates-the corporations them-
selves. The British system suggests several ways in which these needed
reforms can take place.
A. The Problem of Time Pressure
In the course of a rapidly developing American offer, there is
little time in which to act should the offeree company or the offeror
act fraudulently. Even if a shareholder has the temerity to challenge
a corporation, a court will hesitate to issue a restraining order, fearing
that it might appear to be passing on the merits of the offer, or that
the order might irrevocably withdraw an opportunity from other
shareholders, or simply believing that any decision made in the haste
required by a quickly developing tender offer will be a poorly con-
sidered one.276 The same hesitancy results, too, on the SEC's part, for
any action could derail the tender offer.277 Thus, the shareholder's only
course of action may be to wait until the offer has run its course, file
a lawsuit, and be vindicated years later, at least to the extent that
275 Id.
276 Many courts have wrestled with the problem:
rhe equities of the situation speak against an injunction ... The stockholders
are entitled to exercise their own judgment as to these matters.. . . The decision
whether to buy, exchange, or do neither should rest with each individual stock-
holder.
Armour & Co. v. General Host Corp., 296 F. Supp. 470, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (footnote
omitted).
While courts should rigorously enforce the policy of honesty and fair dealing
prescribed by federal securities legislation, they must guard against the risk that,
at the instance of incumbent management, they may be frustrating informed
stockholders from doing what the latter want.
Butler Aviation Int'l, Inc. v. Comprehensive Designers, Inc., 425 F.2d 842, 845 (2d Cir. 1970).
277 See Sowards & Mofsky, supra note 35, at 512. Under the 1934 Act, the Commission
could publish information relating to violations (§ 21(a)), delist the securities (§ 19(a)(2)),
threaten criminal prosecution (§ 32), or seek injunctive relief (§ 21(e))-all drastic measures
and only to be taken after an investigation that may take more time than the consumma-
tion of a tender offer. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78s(a)(2), 78u(a), 78u(e), 78ff (1964).
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money damages can redress the wrong. The gist of the problem is
that the interaction of the explosive tender offer and the inflexible
administrative-judicial process produces a momentum not easily re-
versed. Procedural difficulties may in turn inhibit the system from
deterring questionable practices. Once discovered, fraud may go un-
redressed because of the lack of an effective and immediate remedy.
But time pressure may also cause the target shareholder to
complain even when he detects no possible wrong. He must make
a hurried decision in a pressure-laden atmosphere, a decision perhaps
involving much of his financial security. Although the present Ameri-
can substantive rules ease that burden by guaranteeing, in effect,
ten days in which to decide whether to tender,2 78 ten days may not
be enough. Since the offeror will implement the takeover attempt by
advertisement, a few days may elapse before the shareholder learns of
the offer. He may not then have the latest interim and annual reports
of his company; he probably will not have any information about the
offeror. Other matters may delay his obtaining the information he
wants through his broker, with a day or so left to make an important
decision.279 The pressure of time limitations may also cause offeree
company directors and officials to make decisions in haste. The short
time available and the possible liability if all aspects of the disclosure
are not thoroughly checked may cause management to refrain altogether
from giving an opinion that the shareholder very much wants.
The insufficiency of time in an American tender offer results in
one predominant wrong: the result depends too much on skill and
imagination exercised in a few days' time and not on the past records
and future prospects of the companies involved. The British, on the
other hand, have slowed the takeover bid by requiring that all bids
must be open for twenty-one days.280 The New York Stock Exchange
recommends thirty days, 281 and two states have slowed the tender offer
process by imposing time standards that extend ten or more days
278 See text accompanying notes 77-78 supra.
279 There is no question that the contested take-over bid causes great
confusion and uncertainty among stockholders of the target company ....
First, there is the barrage of charges and countercharges and the doubt generated
by legal actions on both sides. More basically, there is the difficulty of deciding
the financial merits....
It is felt that in extreme cases stockholders will sell their shares in the
market for cash and invest elsewhere simply because they are hopelessly con-
fused ....
Kelly, supra note 4, at 626-28.
280 Crry CODE rule 21.
281 N w YoaK STOCK EXCHANGE, supra note 78.
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beyond federal limits. 282 Thus, the consensus seems to be that tender
offer regulation should inhibit the process to a greater degree than
does present federal regulation.
Slowing down the process would have beneficial effects: suits
based on fraud would be better considered; courts could entertain
them with less sense of urgency, and the threat of suit or administrative
persuasion would have more time to operate. Investors would have
more time to gather information and reach a decision. More time
might result in better reasoned disclosures, arguments, and opinions,
and might give offeree management the opportunity to prepare its
response more effectively. And finally, the filtration process might be
more viable in a tender offer if it had more time to work and if in-
vestors had more time to decide.283
B. Target Defenses
The Virginia statute requiring the cash offeror to file ten days
in advance of the offer and requiring all offers to be open twenty-
one days slows the tender offer process considerably. For that very
reason, however, the Virginia regulation has been criticized as legisla-
tion that "while attempting to cure one evil creates only another-the
further entrenchment of inefficient corporate management." 284 Merely
slowing the process while still focusing most regulation on the offeror
would admittedly have that effect. It therefore becomes apparent
that to gain the beneficial effects of broader time restrictions without
introducing the evil of favoring one side or the other requires further
balancing. The British do just that by prohibiting offeree management
from using any defense "which could effectively result in any bona
fide offer being frustrated or in the shareholders of the offeree company
being denied an opportunity to decide on its merits. '2 5 By both
slowing the tender offer process and prohibiting defenses, the British
system reduces and balances the power of both the offeror and the
target company to influence the offer's outcome.
282 Text accompanying notes 105-07 supra.
283 In an exchange offer, the filing of the 1933 Act registration statement gives the
target company and its shareholders notice of the offer. Offeree management has time to
give due consideration to its response and target shareholders have time to gather and
consider data. Nevertheless, events occurring after the registration becomes effective may,
because of the complete absence of substantive time limitations on exchange offers, give
rise to the same infirmities present in the cash offer area. This seems to have been the
impetus for the amendment extending the Williams Bill's minimal substantive protection
to shareholders faced with an exchange offer. Note 24 supra.
284 Comment, supra note 106, at 335.
285 CiTn CoDE general principle 4.
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Cultivation of tactics that wrest the decision away from offeree
company shareholders has been noted in the American literature.2 6
Paradoxically, although disclosure is provided in order to enable
shareholders to come to an informed decision, the law seems to allow
smart management to defeat the offer. The American system allows
maneuvers that negate the shareholder's vote by tender. This is cer-
tainly an anomaly. To provide the necessary balance among offeror,
target company management, and offeree shareholders, regulation
should prohibit most or all defenses to tender offers.287
Some think this change would favor the offeror by prohibiting
offeree defenses other than entreaty and calling attention to manage-
ment's past record.288 That thought suggests a further improvement
-allowing American target companies to make limited earnings and
sales projections by way of defense to a tender 6ffer. The Wheat Re-
port, as a lexicon of current American views, concludes that forecasts
should not be allowed.289 However, since the Wheat Report directs
itself primarily to prospectuses and does not directly consider tender
offer regulation, the Report's objections should not be dispositive
here. Profit forecasts may not be too important in the relatively slow
exchange offer process. But in a cash tender offer time does not permit
formulation of forecasts and filtration to shareholders, the normal in-
vestment adviser practice in other securities areas. If the cash tender
offer is retained as a faster takeover technique, investors called upon to
make a decision need assistance-profit and sales predictions grounded
on stated assumptions and subject to a reasonable belief test.
Management is certainly capable of making such predictions;
but because it has the most at stake, offeree management may puff
predictions. Subject to a reasonable belief test and a requirement that
assumptions be stated, puffing could be made a fraudulent or decep-
286 Note 224 supra.
287 Administratively, the SEC might define such defenses as fraudulent or deceptive,
in line with a practice the Commission has utilized in other areas. Many defenses are
manipulative or deceptive in the full sense of those words: e.g., protective mergers, dilution
of equity ownership, and other actions taken at the unilateral insistence of target company
management. Of course, the target company must remain free to challenge fraud perpe-
trated by the offeror.
288 An outright prohibition would place management at a significant dis-
advantage in its battle with the offeror because "detailed analysis of 50 subject
companies suggests that . . . the typical subject company has exhibited disap-
pointing operating performance, paid decreasing dividends and is excessively
liquid." Thus, management would ordinarily not have much verbal ammunition
at hand if it is restricted to current and historical material.
Krasik, supra note 4, at 464 (footnote omitted).
289 Note 216 supra.
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tive practice. At the worst, puffing is no more manipulative or decep-
tive than tender offer defenses that silently wrest the decision away
from shareholders. The British allow circumscribed predictions.290
Although the use of profit and sales forecasts has been troublesome,29 1
the British have not moved to eliminate the practice, resolving instead
to continue in the same vein with better safeguards. By slowing the
tender offer process and by prohibiting management from unreason-
ably frustrating an offer, the reforms proposed would put the decision
squarely in the shareholders' hands.
C. Affirmative and Defensive Disclosures
From the shareholders' viewpoint, present affirmative disclosure
requirements are insufficient. 292 Comparison with the proxy contest or
the stock tender offer, the two areas in which an acquirer deals di-
rectly with target company shareholders, reveals a wide disparity in
required disclosure between those two areas and the cash tender offer.
The proxy statement, received well in advance of shareholders' voting,
contains disclosure on both the acquirer and the target company. The
target's annual report may accompany the proxy.2 93 So too with the
prospectus an offeror submits in an exchange offer. In cash tender
offers, present disclosure essentially includes only the background of
the offeror, the offeror's plans for the target, and the offeror's present
and proposed future positions on offeree shares. 294 These items of
information are a patently insufficient basis for the choice between
sticking with present management, tendering, or retaining stock in
hope that the offer will succeed.295
Present disclosure requirements have 'been criticized not only
290 Crry CODE rule 15.
291 Since the creation of the City Code, forecasts made in the course of a take-
over bid have been subjected to, apparently, careful scrutiny.
A vague outline of the assumptions, including commercial ones, on which
forecasts are made has to be provided. A company's auditors or independent
accountants have to affirm that the accounting principles used are consistent
with past practice and financial advisers such as merchant banks have to express
similar support for a board's views. The difficulty is that while this procedure
sounds impressive, neither auditors nor bankers in any sense underwrite or
approve the forecasts themselves ....
.. [T]ighter control of partisan predictions is dearly required.
The Times (London), Jan. 24, 1970, at 15, col. 1.
292 See Fleischer & Mundheim, supra note 6, at 826.
293 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(c), 15 U.S.C. 78n(c) (1964). See generally
SEC Regulation 14A, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 to-12 (1970).
294 Text accompanying notes 56-74 supra.
295 Of course, if many shareholders retain shares in hope the offer will succeed, the
offer will fail. The perversity of that choice, however, should not be grounds for depriving
the shareholder of the opportunity to make it.
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for being insufficient but also for being ineffectual.2 9 6 Disclosure of
position in offeree shares does help the investor evaluate the offeror's
chances for success or control; disclosure of plans, though, is of
dubious utility. As interpreted by one court, an offeror need only state
present, concrete intentions under the heading of plans disclosure.2 97
This may be realistic, since many offerors see an attractive target
selling at a share price not really in accord with asset values or future
prospects. The offeror then goes after the target without intending
to formulate definite plans until success has been achieved. As a
result of the offeror's having few plans and of court decisions, "[t]he
practice that has actually developed in... advertisements demonstrates
cautious legal draftsmanship .... Emphasis throughout the advertise-
ments is on present intention as contrasted with motive or future
intention." 29 8
Before making a choice on a tender offer the shareholder would
like a view of the corporation seeking his shares and a review
of his own company's performance, both financial and as judged by
the market place. One suggestion, short of sending a pro forma state-
ment, envisions stating in the offering advertisement a location from
which the offeror's annual and latest interim reports can be ob-
tained.2 9 The offeree company would then respond in kind. Or the
SEC could utilize its existing power to expand upon the present
affirmative disclosure requirements for offerors and to formulate re-
quirements for target companies. British practice might reveal items
for inclusion in SEC requirements for offerors. 00 Note, however, that
the British do not specifically require disclosure of past and present
operating and financial details. But the general British disclosure
standard that shareholders receive all information necessary to making
an informed judgment on the offer would require disclosure of some
items of that nature.
The British, unlike the Americans, also require target company
296 "Most witnesses . . . [in the hearings on the Williams Bill] were . .. vague about
how the required disclosure would in fact help the public investor." Hamilton, supra
note 4, at 276 (footnote omitted). "The most obvious result of these disclosure requirements
is a substantial growth of verbiage in ... tender offers, and a corresponding decrease in
their readability." Id at 282.
297 Susquehanna Corp. v. Pan Am. Sulphur Co., 423 F.2d 1075, 1085-86 (5th Cir. 1970).
298 Hamilton, supra note 4, at 283.
299 Sowards & Mofsky, supra note 35, at 513.
300 British affirmative disclosure does include some useful items: if a partial bid, the
reasons why; whether the acquired securities will be transferred to any other person;
agreements between the offeror and offeree directors; recent and past quotations of the
shares involved; and any unpublished change in the offeree's financial position known
to the offeror. Text accompanying note 211 supra.
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management to make certain disclosures. °30 As in offeror disclosure, the
British general disclosure standard would require the offeree to set forth
financial and operating details.
American regulation has been strongly criticized because it does
not require that target company management either voice an opinion
on the offer or make any disclosures.30 2 That situation should be
changed: first, a shareholder should never be in the dark as to how his
own board of directors feels about a major corporate development such
as an offer; and second, the shareholder may not be able to ferret
out the information on the status of his company which he needs to
make the major investment decision posed by the offer. The possibility
that American offeree management might remain silent so as not to
attract attention to the offer heightens the necessity of mandatory
offeree disclosure.
If the SEC moves to provide for more disclosure by offeror and
offeree companies, the Commission should take special care in formu-
lating these requirements to meet the needs of investors. The call
for special care springs from the limited time for decision on a tender
offer, and the resulting unavailability of a filtration process to make
complicated disclosure meaningful for the shareholder asked to tender
his shares. The new disclosure cannot be like that now required in a
proxy merger statement or in a prospectus, formidable to meaningless
for the average investor.03 Tender offer disclosure requirements must
be formulated on the basis of what the average investor understands
and wants or needs to know. Such disclosure should look to both
offeror and offeree for operating and financial information. It could be
minimal but informative, including a brief description of past and
present operations, future prospects, balance sheets and earnings
statements for the last two years, and price-earnings ratios for a similar
period.304
301 Offerees must voice an opinion on the offer, detail offeree and offeree directors'
holdings in offeree and offeror shares, list the directors' individual intentions as to the
offer, and detail offeree directors' contracts with the offeror. Text accompanying notes
234-56 supra.
302 E.g., Krasik, supra note 4, at 458-66.
303 As one source phrases the problem: "It is doubtful that anyone ever read the
prospectus other than the parties preparing it, the SEC staff (which developed an extensive
comment letter), and the printers, who charged $15,000 for their efforts." Schneider, supra
note 5, at 1333.
304 Most corporations involved in a tender offer voluntarily disclose much of this
information so these requirements would not be an added burden in most tender offers.
They would, however, guard against the few occasions where an offeree remains silent or
where the offeror conducts a hard-hitting, surprise bid that offers only cash and the
minimal amount of disclosure to target shareholders.
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The principal problem with simplified, meaningful disclosure
upon which investors can make an informed decision is that such dis-
closure may not lend itself to the other purpose of affirmative dis-
closure-the prevention and discovery of fraud. A possible answer is
a dual disclosure system involving direct, simplified disclosure to in-
vestor and more complex reporting to agencies to ensure against fraud,
with little attention to filtration in the fast takeover. A detailed doc-
ument would go to the SEC. Another document, partly a truncated
version of the filed document and partly information written specifi-
cally for the average investor, would go to the shareholders.3 5
Movement in the disclosure area will not derogate from the gen-
eral American antifraud provisions, rule lOb-5 and section 14(e). Rather,
by formulating concrete affirmative disclosure requirements, the pro-
posal would reduce the area of exposure to fraud action, cutting into
the disclosure morass with understandable rules. This in turn would
tend not only to aid investors, but to achieve certainty and ease of
compliance. The major criticism of securities regulation today centers
around the increasing uncertainty among those who move in areas
governed by American securities law.306 This doubt exists in large part
because of the imprecision of the all-pervading American general
disclosure, antifraud rule lOb-5, and will probably increase as section
14(e) becomes more widely interpreted. To corporations, these prin-
ciples create doubt as to what action and what disclosure are required
in making or defending against a tender offer; corporate officials must
act quickly with few concrete guidelines.307 One effect of that uncer-
tainty is to produce in some cases the opposite extreme of overdis-
closure. 03 From the investors' standpoint, with only a few days to
305 The Wheat Report recommends efforts in this direction, proposing a separate
six- or seven-page summary of merger proxy statements, printed separately and containing
essential information for investors. WHEAT REPORT 376-81. The Report's suggestion shows
that such a dichotomy is not unrealistic. And time considerations in a tender offer make
such efforts just as imperative as efforts in the statutory merger situation.
300 The law in this area has reached an intolerable level of uncertainty. This
uncertainty arises in large part from the failure of the Commission to make known
its interpretative positions, and also from the Commission's flexibility (one is
tempted to say, inconsistency) in applying its interpretations. We cannot hope
to reduce such a complex body of law to a black-letter code as simple to apply
as, say, a multiplication table. On the other hand, members of the public at-
tempting to comply with the law are entitled to a somewhat higher order of
predictability than that presently obtaining.
Schneider, supra note 5, at 1357.
307 Incumbent target company management has a greater problem because the only
regulatory guideline is the general disclosure standard. A reading of Krasik, supra note 4,
reveals the complexity and uncertainty for an offeree attempting to comply with rule
lOb-5 or § 14(e).
808 "I have generally advised clients engaged in tender offers to make disclosures by
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reflect upon the document, overdisciosure may be just as bad as under-
disclosure. 0 9 The investor never reaches the meaningful content of
the circular because he is stopped cold by the formidable bulk and
appearance of the document.
The absence of extensive experience with lob-5 principles in
the tender offer area compounds the doubt. Little case law exists on
what lOb-5, through 14(e), requires in matters peculiar to tender
offers. The first major judicial statement on 14(e), although positing
14(e)'s transport of lob-5 principles into the tender offer area,810
indicates that the standard might be different in the takeover area.
Judge Friendly, in reversing a district court finding of a 14(e) viola-
tion, spoke of parties to a tender offer:
They act quickly, sometimes impulsively, often in angry response
to what they consider, whether rightly or wrongly, to be low blows
by the other side. Probably there will no more be a perfect tender
offer than a perfect trial. Congress intended to assure basic honesty
and fair dealing, not to impose an unrealistic requirement of labo-
ratory conditions .... 311
The general lOb-5 standards may thus be of lesser import in the
takeover area. The courts will have to decide on a case-by-case basis
what is fraudulent or deceptive in connection with a tender offer.
D. Codification of Rules
The British City Code does have attractive features in the way
of ease of compliance. The Code communicates certain policies found
in the general principles and the less mechanical Code rules. These
same policies may exist in American law, yet they are not so plainly
stated, often being the result of SEC interpretation or court decision.
An American corporate official knows he should not trade on inside
information. His lawyer tells him because his lawyer knows a court
has deduced that principle from rule lOb-5, which the SEC in turn has
adopted pursuant to section 10 of the 1934 Act.3 12 A British financier
I
way of an offering circular patterned after, but more abbreviated than, an S-1 Registration
Statement." Kennedy, supra note 89, at 1107.
809 The British have recognized that fact: "It may be that apart from the expert
investor, a shareholder pays little attention to a long and detailed prospectus and that too
much disclosure, so far from helping, wearies and confuses him." Cole, Morley & Scott,
supra note 121, at 370.
310 Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 945 (2d
Cir. 1969).
311 Id. at 948.
812 See Manne, Insider Trading and the Administrative Process, 35 GEo. WAsH. L.
R v. 473 (1967).
[Vol. 56:685
TENDER OFFER REGULATION
can find the same standard of conduct plainly stated in the City Code:
"No dealings of any kind.., in the shares of the offeror and offeree com-
panies by any person who is privy to the preliminary take-over or
merger discussions . . . may take place ... ,.*13 The same distinction
carries over into areas where a wrong might be less obvious than
trading on inside information. Compare, on general disclosure,
"[s]hareholders shall have in their possession sufficient evidence, facts
and opinions upon which an adequate judgement and decision can be
reached"3 14 with "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to make any
untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state any material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the cir-
cumstances under which they are made, not misleading... ."315 True,
the statements are of slightly different import and coverage. That is
one of the principal American problems: one rule covers an end-
less spectrum of conduct.
An ideal regulatory system should not have to wait for case-by-case
development. A set of specific rules deduced from the general standard
would be much simpler.3 16 Ideally, courts do formulate specific rules
in the litigation process. Again ideally, legal periodicals and treatises
collect courts' formulations in articles. However, this smacks of retro-
spective legislation and abdication of administrative responsibility:
"The function of filling in the interstices of the Act should be per-
formed, as much as possible, through this quasi-legislative promulgatidn
of rules to be applied in the future. 3 17 Achieving the goal of predict-
ability by formulating disclosure rules and rules defining which tender
offer practices are manipulative, deceptive, or fraudulent, together
with cooling and balancing the tender offer process, will lead to better
regulation of tender offers. One more expedient may further enhance
predictability: the drawing of basic legislation-new disclosure rules
for offeror and offeree and definitions of fraudulent or deceptive
313 Crry CODE rule 30.
314 Id. general principle 3.
315 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (Supp. V, 1970).
316 A statutory rule would be preferable to the piecemeal creation of a standard
of management conduct by court decision. A rule could provide a guideline for
management so that it would know in advance what action must be taken to
avoid liability, as well as provide a clear guideline by which the Commission
and courts can judge management conduct. In addition, a statutory rule
could avoid the confusion of possibly conflicting holdings in various lower
courts. Such a rule could save the time, expense and potential hardships to
shareholders and management of litigating, over a period of years, each aspect
of the disclosure problem that would be settled by the enactment of a compre-
hensive rule.
Krasik, supra note 4, at 473-74.
317 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947).
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practices-into one document, arranged in an order paralleling the
chronology of a tender offer and written in understandable, concise
prose. This final step would bring tender offer regulation full circle
-to an American equivalent of the British City Code.
